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THE ART INVESTMENT CONTRACT:
APPLICATION OF SECURITIES LAW TO
ART PURCHASES
I. Introduction
The best capital investment is not South African
gold or Canadian wheat or Bolivian tin, but art.'
The common regard for art as a luxury acquisition exclusively
within the province of the wealthy has undergone dramatic change
in recent years to a general respect for art as an accessible invest-
ment property.2 Major corporations improve their public image by
funding the arts and swell their assets by acquiring art in various
media.' Mutual fund consortia have been set up to purchase art.4
Investment advisors increasingly encourage their clients to
purchase art as a hedge against inflation. 5
Yet art works have little intrinsic value. The value of an acqui-
sition is peculiarly dependent upon transient and unpredictable
1. L. DuBoFp, DESKBOOK OF ART LAW at 364 (1977) [hereinafter cited as DESKBOOK]
(quoting Maddocks, Picasso and the Midas Touch, Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 22,
1975, at 26, col. 3). Art properties compare demonstrably well with traditional investment
vehicles such as stock. Art works have shown an overall appreciation of 1800% over the last
twenty years, compared with 400% for stock. DESKBOOK, supra, at 361-62.
2. Prints from the Picasso 347 Series were "traded over the telephone from dealer to
dealer like coffee futures, for as much as $1 million." Saltzman, Lively Market in Prints,
ARTNEWS, Sept. 1979, at 78. Museum and auction attendance has risen markedly as the
public is drawn by media coverage of museum treasures of inestimable value and sensational
bidding at major houses. See TIME, Dec. 31, 1979, at 46-55. The exploitation of art as an
investment property has provoked writers to harsh criticism, see, e.g., Hughes, Confusing
Art with Bullion, TIME, Dec. 31, 1979 at 55-56, and antagonized artists who resent seeing
their work "bought and sold like so much expensive, inedible fish, to be hidden away in
locked vaults." N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1979, at B6, col. 3.
3. See Metz, The Corporation as Art Patron: A Growth Stock, ARTNEWS, May, 1979.
Corporate contributions to the arts have already reached $250 million annually. Id. at 43.
The art holdings of Chase Manhattan Bank have been estimated at more than $5 million.
See Sloane, Collecting at the Chase: Fine Art Stands for Good Business, ARTNEWS, May,
1979, at 48.
4. DESKBOOK, supra note 1, at 380-81.
5. Id. at 361.
6. See R. DUFFY, REPRESENTING ARTISTS, DEALERS AND COLLECTORS at 2 (1977) (herein-
after cited as DUFFY). Each work is complete in itself; whatever merit it posesses must be
judged, uniquely, by reference only to itself. The purchaser of an art work acquires an inter-
est in the artist's continued market success; one purchasing the work of a living artist bene-
fits from the artist's continuing production.
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vagaries of taste.7 Although vast sums are traded annually, there is
no central exchange for art and no readily monitored daily price
quotations to guide the unsophisticated purchaser in determining
the current and potential value of art as an investment prospect.'
To minimize the investment risk, the advice of an art expert may
be necessary to aid in the final selection, but securing such inde-
pendent advice may be beyond the means of a growing number of
purchasers. These investors must frequently rely upon persons
whose interests may not coincide with their own.
Art transactions are in substance investment contracts. Accord-
ingly, the art investor could benefit from the same preventive and
remedial regulations imposed upon conventional investment trans-
actions. This Comment will first describe and analyze the five prin-
cipal types of art transactions. Second, the substantive concerns
presently facing the art investor and existing protections will be
discussed. Third, this Comment will examine the protections which
are available to the investor in conventional securities investments.
Fourth, the proposition that art transactions typically constitute
investment contracts will be analyzed in light of Supreme Court
decisions which have established the parameters of what will be
considered to be an investment contract. Finally, the current posi-
tion of the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") as to
whether traditional art transactions are investment contracts and
thereby subject to SEC regulation will be discussed.
7. How wonderful, we are told, that all things rise in price.... Twenty years ago,
you might not have got $1,000 for the . . . painting that now fetches $100,000 ...
One is left with the impression-indeed it is cultivated assiduously by the largest
gaggle of public relations people ever to batten on the flank of culture-that art
prices can only go up.. . . But the unpleasant fact is that no reputation is immune to
fashion. The art market is built on it. . . . If artists who in their day were considered
outstanding, whose work was underwritten by the capital and by the social opinions
of a powerful empire, could vanish into the oubliette, there is no reason to suppose
that the same thing may not happen to their modern equivalents.. . . What goes up
is quite able to come down. It only needs a little crack in the wall of confidence.
Hughes, supra note 2, at 55-56.
8. "Investing in art is a speculative undertaking; at best it is a gamble." DESKBOOK,
supra note 1, at 365. The serious investor must have a profound knowledge of his business
in order to succeed. It is advisable for him to specialize in a specific period and medium, and
to read widely, consulting trade and price trend magazines such as The International Art
Market. Id.
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II. Transactions in Art
A. Auctions
Public auction sales account for fifty percent of art transactions.'
The auction sale has been defined as the "public sale of property
to the highest bidder." The most prominent feature of this selling
forum is the unpredictability of the final knock-down price.10 Be-
cause the final sales price results from open bidding, it is accepted
as the "fair market value" of the piece for various purposes."
Knowledge of the reserve price, the minimum price at which an
owner will permit the piece to be sold,' 2 would be helpful to the
9. DESKBOOK, supra note 1. at 542.
10. As agent for the owner, the auctioneer solicits ascending bids and determines the
final unchallenged bidder. See generally DESKBOOK, supra note 1, at 537-71. It is a well
established principle that the public price bid constitutes an offer which is accepted upon
the falling of the auctioneer's hammer; at that moment the sale is complete. See U.C.C. 2-
328(2) (1978). The auctioneer is competent to record the sale in a ledger maintained for that
purpose and his memorandum is deemed to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. See also N.Y.
GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-701.6 (McKinney 1978); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 25 (McKinney 1966).
11. In theory, a public auction should be the ideal way to buy or sell a work of art.
The buyer is assured that he is paying only the smallest necessary increment over
what a rival purchaser would be willing to pay. The seller is assured that he is receiv-
ing the best price that anyone present is willing to pay.
F. FELDMAN & S. WEL., ART WORKS: LAW, POLICY, PRACTICE at 355 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as ART WORKS].
"The fair market value is the price at which the property would change hands between a
willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to sell and both hav-
ing reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts." Treas. Reg. § 1.170-1(c) (1978).
"Simply stated, auctions establish prices." Deskbook, supra note 1, at 542. Auction cumu-
lative catalogs are excellent sources of price information. The major houses publish annual
volumes listing prices obtained for important works. Catalogs for specific auctions are usu-
ally available in advance of the sale or on the same day. These ordinarily contain, keyed to
individual lots, biographical information about the artist, provenance, conditions of sale,
and occasionally, an estimated value.
12. Despite demand, the auction houses have refused to publish reserve prices, arguing
that disclosure of this price would convert the auction into a retail sale. DESKBOOK, supra
note 1, at 548. "The amount of the reserve has become the last bastion of the auctioneer's
preserve; much akin to a lady's age, but undoubtedly of interest to a wider audience." ART
WORKS, supra note 11, at 364. However, the houses are ordinarily careful to advise that lots
are for sale with reserve unless otherwise indicated. This practice comports with U.C.C. § 2-
328(3) (1978), which provides that lots are presumed to be with reserve unless explicitly
stated to be offered without reserve. If offered without reserve, a lot may not be withdrawn
unless no bid is made within a reasonable time. Id. A New York Senate bill introduced in
1974 which would have required a house to state whether a reserve price existed and its
amount (with bidding to start at that price) failed to pass in the face of vigorous opposition.
N.Y.S. No. 10111 197th Sess. (1974). See DESKBOOK, supra note 1, at 547-48.
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purchaser in establishing the value of a piece.1 3 If this price is not
met during the bidding, the piece will be withdrawn by the
auctioneer.'
B. Galleries
Purchases may be made privately and confidentially through a
gallery or private dealer. 15 A dealer manages a significantly lesser
volume of works than the auction house, and may specialize in
works of a specific period or origin. He can therefore apply his ex-
pertise to the selection and marketing of each piece individually."
Frequently, a dealer will be the exclusive representative or distrib-
utor of the work of one painter or graphic artist.17 Thus, a single
dealer may possess unique knowledge of that artist's standing in
the market and will exercise control over the artist's promotion
and distribution. In this way the dealer acts as a market-maker.18
A dealer will encourage the sale of art work for two reasons.
13. An owner wishing to market a piece through a major house must execute a consign-
ment agreement appointing the house as his agent with the agent earning a commission
ranging from 121/2 to 25% of the price obtained. In addition, there may be a 10% seller's
surcharge. The owner bears the consequences of inauthenticity: withdrawal or rescission.
See REPRESENTING ARTISTS, DEALERS AND COLLECTORS 487-90 (R. Lerner ed. 1979) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Lerner]. See also ART WORKS, supra note 11, at 355-60.
14. Failure to meet the reserve price is referred to as "burning." The owner may be
forced to sell privately at a substantially reduced price. Lerner, supra note 13, at 174-75.
"Burning" might be avoided by self-bidding, however, this practice is prohibited. U.C.C. §
2-328(4) (1978). See also L. Duboff, Auction Problems: Going, Going, Gone, 26 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 499 (1977); N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1979, at L44, col. 2 (Stradavarius withdrawn despite
bid of $95,000).
15. Obviously, the prices obtained in private dealings would be confidential and not ac-
cessible to the general public as auction prices are, but may be known to dealers. Lerner,
supra note 13, at 169.
16. The dealer is also in a position to identify potential purchasers and to privately ne-
gotiate a price and payment terms more favorable than could be achieved through the auc-
tion procedure. Id. at 173.
17. The exclusive dealer may preempt even direct sales by the artist himself, or require
prior approval before a direct sale, depending on the terms of the dealer-artist contract.
Preemptions may be necessary to prevent the artist from underselling the gallery. See
DESKBOOK, supra note 1, at 366. See also Lerner, supra note 13, at 170-71.
18. "Another unique feature of transactions pertaining to art is that art dealers can cre-
ate a market for certain items where such a market would not otherwise exist. Manipulation
of supply versus demand is possible where the supply of a particular object is limited."
Twaddle, Acquisition and Disposition of Art Objects, IV Art & The Law, Issue 3 at 67, 69
(1979). "Many art galleries aggressively create markets for the works they handle and point
this fact out to potential art investors." DEsKBOOK, supra note 1, at 371. See also note 97
infra.
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First, he has a responsibility to the artist he represents or exhibits
and will do his utmost to promote the artist's career. 19 Second, a
dealer has a financial interest in selling the works he exhibits. A
dealer's selection of an artist for exhibition is the result of careful
business calculation.20
A transaction through a dealer is ordinarily in the nature of an
outright purchase at a non-negotiable price.2 1 A purchaser lacking
a high degree of sophistication may be obliged to accept the
dealer's non-negotiable price. Rarely will a dealer disclose informa-
tion as to past prices obtained"2 which would permit the buyer to
determine whether the asking price is fair, that is, whether the
price corresponds to the piece's present value and potential for
appreciation.
The gallery selling to strangers may extend a discount to the
purchaser of an expensive work. s In addition, a buyer dissatisfied
with a major purchase may be permitted to return the piece to the
gallery for refund or for credit.2 4 A gallery, however, frequently en-
joys a following of longstanding clientele, who rely upon its expert
personnel for counselling and for location of art properties. A
fiduciary relation with such clients may arise which would impose
a duty on the gallery dealer to make greater disclosure to these
buyers.2 5
19. The American Artist Business Letter of September, 1974 suggested as a rule of
thumb that the artist be shown (solo) every two or three years, and that the dealer increase
sales by at least 20% annually. See Lerner, supra note 13 at 681-82. A dealer attracts buyers
for current exhibits through direct mailings, brochures and advertisements in trade and gen-
eral readership publications. Trade critics are invited to review current shows. See Matter of
Friedman, 64 A.D.2d 70, 86, 407 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1015 (2d Dep't 1978).
20. Artists compete vigorously for shows with established dealers. The dealer may re-
present the artist on a consignment basis, with the dealer taking a share of from 33% to
60% of sales, or the dealer may purchase from the artist outright at a discount and resell
the work for his own account. See Lerner, supra note 13, at 336. The dealer ordinarily
resells low to moderately priced works of art at 20% to 100% above cost. D.SKBOOK, supra
note 1, at 365.
21. See notes 200-05 infra and accompanying text.
22. See note 14 supra.
23. "Gallery owners like to move their stock as well as any merchant and, if asked, will
often cut at least 10 percent off the asking price of [an art work]." Nailing Your Investment
to the Wall, GENTLEMEN'S QuARTxsLY, Dec. 1974, at 126.
24. As a practical matter, however, most galleries will probably refund only for major
purchases because frequent sale reversals are not conducive to smooth business operations.
25. "A reputable dealer's knowledge is accumulated through years of collecting and re-
searching his subject. . . . We go to a particular dealer not simply to buy [an artwork], but
19801
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Installment purchases are available through most galleries. The
buyer may take advantage of this feature by paying a portion of
the sales price and then immediately reconsigning the piece to the
dealer for resale. The object is rapid profit from the resale of the
piece as soon as its price rises, with resale occurring before the
final remittance.s
C. The Gallery Repurchase Policy
A New York gallery recently offered twelve nineteenth century
European paintings, each selected on the basis of its assessed po-
tential for "significant financial appreciation over the next dec-
ade," and together comprising the "Guaranteed Investment Collec-
tion."" The offer included a written guaranty to the purchaser
which obligated the gallery to repurchase the painting upon re-
quest within six or eleven years for 15% to 30% more than the
price paid.2 8 This experimental offer was followed a few months
later with the second in a projected series of guaranteed invest-
ment collections.29 Again comprised of twelve nineteenth century
European paintings, the offer retains the repurchase option, now
because we trust his visual expertise and his knowledge of the field. Essentially, we are also
buying his taste and sensibility." F. FELDMAN & S. WEIL, LEGAL AND BUSINESS PROBLEMS OF
ArIsTs, ART GALLERIES AND MUSEUMS 620 (1973).
26. See DESKBOOK, supra note 1, at 368, where the specifics of one gallery's installment
plan are discussed. The gallery charges a 1% monthly finance charge, but assures investors
that the value of most art has been increasing at many times that rate. Independent financ-
ing is also available through the International Art Registry, Ltd. Id. at 369. Installment sales
may be employed to serve a function identical to credit extensions or margin buying on a
stock market. Margin requirements are set out in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 7,
15 U.S.C. § 78g (1976).
27. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1980, Magazine, at 26.
28. The 15% figure is based on one item, originally selling for $20,000, resellable after
six years for $23,000, and after eleven years for $26,000. The guaranty offer is available only
to the original purchaser and the offer also stipulates that the work be in unchanged condi-
tion at the time of redemption. Letter from Daniel B. Grossman to Maureen Holm (Mar. 5,
1980).
29. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1980, Magazine, at 84, and Oct. 5, 1980, Magazine, at 99.
At 15% over six years, the original terms improved very little, if at all, on projected pass-
book earnings for the same period. The simple repurchase policy contained in the second
offer of the series is at base an open-ended refund offer. See note 24 supra. "[T]he investor
has not been restored to status quo since he will have lost the amount of interest which the
money would otherwise have earned." DESKBOOK, supra note 1, at 369. Perhaps the benefits
gained by the refund arrangement are similar to those enjoyed by the mere rental of art
works, i.e., purely aesthetic. For a discussion of rental offerings, see DESKBOOK, supra note 1,
at 379.
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exercisable within twelve years, but has eliminated the guaranteed
profit. The paintings were selected "based both on their aesthetic
merit and on [the gallery's] belief, as experts in the field, that their
values [would] rise. '80
An offer carrying a repurchase option holds appeal for two rea-
sons. First, the buyer is assured that the gallery has selected each
piece for this special collection based upon the gallery dealer's ex-
pert assessment of its appreciation potential. Any professional
dealer's endorsement of a piece or of an artist may be reasonably
interpreted by the lay purchaser as a warranty of future financial
promise. The dealer carefully selects the artists he represents; by
the mere showing of artists so selected, a dealer may signal to the
purchaser that the artist's work is a viable investment." By its
terms this offer invites explicit reliance on the dealer's overt
endorsement.
Second, the promised repurchase shields the investor against un-
expected downturns in market value and consequent loss upon re-
sale. Art works are individually executed and therefore unique, and
because there is no central exchange market for art works, a single
painting is generally not immediately convertible.3 2 Short-term ap-
preciation gains may be quickly diminished by the costs attendant
to ordinary resale.38 The repurchase policy gives the investor the
option to recoup his entire outlay immediately. Particularly in view
of temporal and monetary burdens, resale back to the gallery may
prove, as a practical matter, to be the investor's only means of liq-
uidating the investment property. 4
D. The Mail Order Membership Purchase
Limited edition prints, ceramics and books are currently offered
30. See notes 171-72 infra and accompanying text.
31. See note 25 supra.
32. The typical art investor is no match for the true art expert, to whom the most sizea-
ble profits inevitably fall. See DESKBOOK, supra note 1, at 365.
The so-called country auction where the city slicker might once snap up for a song a
Revere salver or a federal highboy is as distant a memory as the nickel newspaper.
Says Scudder Smith, editor of Antiques and Arts Weekly, "You look around some of
these little country auctions and there are 25 well-known dealers there." TiME, Dec.
31, 1979 at 52.
33. See DESKBOOK, supra note 1, at 365.
34. See notes 220-24 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of similar investor
reliance in a securities context.
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by mail order. For example, a Manhattan-based print marketing
group readily affirms its purpose as the offer by subscription of
selected original graphics believed to possess a high average appre-
ciation potential.3 5 This distributor has enjoyed mounting success
since commencing operations in 1972, and continues to enlarge its
national membership."0
For a twenty-five dollar membership fee applicable to the first
purchase, the investor receives a monthly series of portfolios com-
piling current print offerings selected on the basis of the distribu-
tor's expert assessment of each print's appreciation potential.
While the promotional material points out the aesthetic merit of
the prints, the offering is emphatically investment-oriented.3  The
distributor acts as the exclusive representative of the artists fea-
tured, and thus occupies a controlling position in the market for
these works.
The prospective purchaser is cautioned against buying any art
work without first seeking professional investment advice. 8 The
distributor extends such advice and invites the investor's explicit
reliance on its recommendations.3 "
The mail order print distributor offers members a complete
package of investment services. The distributor functions through-
out the process from offer to sale as expert advisor, sales agent and
seller.40 The enormous breadth of prices for the prints ensures ap-
35. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Magazine, Feb. 3, 1980, at 49.
36. See, BARRON'S, Oct. 1, 1979, at 37; WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 1976, at 1, col. 2; GErrLE-
MANS QUARTERLY, Dec. 1974, at 124.
37. In response to an inquiry, the prospective member receives an introductory letter
which persuasively demonstrates the appreciation potential of prints, "when chosen by ex-
perts," with examples of annual appreciation rates attained for past offerings. The sales
literature is persuasive, and it encourages members to rely on the distributor's professed
expertise in compiling the print investment portfolio, as well as on its optimistic predictions
of the rise in future value of each selection. Letter from Original Print Collectors Group,
Ltd. to Maureen Holm, (Mar. 20, 1980).
38. The letter from the Original Print group notes that a dealer's overhead results in
prices considerably higher than those available to members. It is also pointed out that as the
membership rolls expand, the organization "can negotiate for better prices and offer a wider
selection [of prints]." Id.
39. The bi-monthly newsletter published by the distributor contains specific investment
recommendations. To facilitate trading among members, the distributor provides market
information and publishes "bids" which have been received for prints held by other
members.
40. The expert art advisor, sales agent and seller perform functions analogous to those
[Vol. IX
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peal to a broad public of equally varying economic means."' As this
investment plan contemplates that members rely on the distribu-
tor in each of its capacities, the investor's readiness to purchase by
mail order even very expensive works is quite remarkable.i
2
E. The Volume Discount Purchase
Galleries and other art merchants with increasing frequency are
engaging artists to specially prepare a series of lithographs or other
art works to be distributed in bulk purchase to private buyers."'
Through its exclusive relationship with the artist and sole control
over distribution of the works, the art merchant is in a position to
offer the works at a price significantly below the aggregate fair
market value of the works if each were sold individually."
The fair market value of the work may be established by means
of a formal appraisal statement which is offered as a feature of the
investment plan. This formal appraisal is used by the purchaser
who intends to resell the work to calculate the profits to be gained
and by the purchaser donating the work to substantiate tax deduc-
tions. A list of suitable donees may also be provided by the distrib-
utor. The investor need never take actual possession of the works;
under the plan the merchant arranges for direct delivery to the
selected donee or resale purchaser.' 5
performed by the investment advisor, broker and dealer in the securities market. See notes
100-37 infra and accompanying text for discussion of regulatory mechanisms in the securi-
ties market.
41. Prices for the print offerings range from $100 for a contemporary print to $28,000 for
Lautrec's "Aristide Bruant", and include framing. In December, 1979, the Lautrec sold at
auction for the record price of $26,000. See TIME, Dec. 31, 1979, at 47 and note 11 supra.
42. The distributor reports that Old Master prints sell out immediately. Letter from
Original Print Collectors Group, Ltd. to Maureen Holm (Mar. 20, 1980).
43. See, e.g., Art Appraisers of America, Ltd. [1976] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,796.
See also Village Voice, May 26, 1980, at 76, col. 3, for an advertisement soliciting artists to
prepare limited edition ceramics.
44. In Art Appraisers of American, the limited edition numbered 500 for one series and
1000 for another. Most limited editions are restricted to 200 to 300 reproductions ("pulls").
[1976] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 87,079.
45. These features are all included in the Art Appraisers' offer. See note 43 supra. Also
included is an opinion of counsel that the works are eligible for capital gains treatment. The
Art Appraiser offering has served as a format for similar offerings. See, e.g., Metropolitan
Graphic Arts Distributors, Ltd., SEC Staff Reply Letter, May 31, 1977, also discussed at
note 215 infra; Anthony R. Pratley, [1979] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 82,325.
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F. Art Advisors
As art ownership becomes popularized, market stratifications
naturally develop, creating the opportunity for independent art ad-
visors, of varying qualifications and reputability, to serve potential
clientele of varying economic means. Understandably, the appeal
of such advice increases proportionally to the sum invested. In
each of the above transactions, investors were offered the expertise
of an art advisor as an essential and attractive component of the
purchase plan.4" Art advisors have proliferated in major cities, in-
cluding New York, serving as direct consultants to individuals and
to corporations.47 Advisors vary widely in pricing, philosophy and
qualifications."s Because they are unaffiliated, unlicensed and un-
regulated,49 great care must be exercised in the selection of an art
46. The advisory function of the private gallery owner is not easily categorized. He may
not expressly hold himself out to the public as an art advisor, yet he must inevitably make
statements incidental to any art purchase. The purchaser of works exhibited in private gal-
leries may elicit from the professional dealer information of an advisory or expert nature,
which, to the extent granted, will be relied upon. See note 25 supra.
47. See generally Rosenbaum, Choosing the Chooser: How to Pick an Art Consultant,
ARTNEWS, May, 1979, at 52-58. Corporate entities increasingly fund the arts, with annual
gifts totalling in excess of $250,000,000. See Metz, The Corporation as Art Patron: A
Growth Stock, ARTNEWS, May, 1979, at 40, 43. Corporations have also become an acknowl-
edged and much solicited major consumer of artistic production. See Sloane, supra note 3,
at 47. In some instances corporate departments and vice presidencies have been established
to make acquisitions. Id. at 40. In-house as well as independent art consultants are hired,
and the independents target corporations with advertisements in the trades. The advisory
service may take the form of newsletter distribution to subscribers, individual counselling,
or the supply by Sotheby Parke Bernet to a major bank of factual art research studies. See
TIME, Dec. 31, 1979, at 55. Sotheby Parke Bernet does not make any financial recommenda-
tions; rather, it supplies Citibank's Fine Arts Management Service with facts concerning
past market performance along with curatorial analyses, but without any investment prog-
noses. Economic recommendations are the province of the bank's own advisors. Telephone
conversation with Manager, Institutional Services and Market Research, Sotheby Parke
Bernet, (Apr. 1, 1980).
48. Mr. C. Hugh Hildesley of Sotheby Parke Bernet recommends five years experience in
the field of specialization for persons performing appraisal functions. See Lerner, supra note
13, at 182. Similar to appraisers, art advisors must be equipped to estimate current market
values and to perform authentications.
49. "[T]he most obvious sources of guidance-art experts-are rarely accessible to buy-
ers, and there are no licensing agencies, qualifying examinations, referral agencies, or ethical
committees comparable to those in the medical or legal professions to guide the nonprofes-
sional." ART WORKS, supra note 11, at 1063.
There appears to be no precise definition of an art expert. Dudley Easby, Secretary of
the New York Metopolitan Museum of Art, declared: '[s]ome writers have preferred
to use the word 'authority' rather than 'expert', but I think we'll agree that he might
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advisor. 50
III. Substantive Concerns and Existing Protections for
the Art Investor
There are four main concerns to be satisfied in relation to the
purchase of art as an investment property. It is self-evident that
the art purchaser assumes like every buyer of personalty, that the
seller holds and can transfer unencumbered title to the art work in
return for the purchase price.61 This fundamental assumption is
implemented by the Uniform Commercial Code which imposes on
the seller a warranty of title in every sales contract.52 The remain-
ing concerns, authenticity, present value and appreciation poten-
tial merit further discussion.
be a dealer, museum curator, artist, art historian, professor, conservator, researcher,
metallurgist, chemist, X-ray man, or even a nuclear physicist. One thing all these
people have in common among themselves and in common with other expert wit-
nesses is some special knowledge based on long study and experience. Another thing
they have in common-and this is contrary to popular belief-is that they are not
possessed of such infallibility.'
Id. at 1063 n.50. (quoting Easby & Collins, The Legal Aspects of Forgery and the Protec-
tion of the Expert, N.Y. METROPOLITAN MUSEUM Op ART BULL., Feb. 1968, at 258.)
50. A New York gallery, located in the heart of the financial district, offers free consulta-
tions designed to prepare investors to deal more effectively with art merchants.
51. The leading decision relating to the warranty of title for an art work is Menzel v.
List, 49 Misc. 2d 300, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (Sup. Ct. 1966), modified as to damages, 28 A.D.2d
516, 279 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1st Dep't 1967), rev'd as to modifications, 24 N.Y.2d 91, 246 N.E.2d
274, 298 N.Y.S.2d 979 (1969). The appropriate measure of damages was the fair market
value of the work at the time of its return to the rightful owner. Accord, Itoh v. Kimi Sales,
Ltd., 74 Misc. 2d 402, 345 N.Y.S.2d 416 (Civ. Ct. 1973). The loss of artwork by theft is a
matter for intense international concern. See Feldman, To Catch a Thief, ART & THE LAW,
Jan. 1975, at 3. See also H.R. Rep. No. 13446, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 112 CONG. REc. 5386
(1966) providing for the creation of a National Registry of Art seated in the Smithsonian
Institute in Washington. While not enacted, this bill would have mandated criminal sanc-
tions for false information supplied to the Registry, but filing was to be voluntary. The
registration of art was analogized to other filing systems intended to promote certainty in
commercial transactions such as real estate, copyright and securities. See American Bar As-
soc. Reports, Vol. 151, 2495-96 (1966). Museums and art dealers' associations have begun to
maintain their own records of stolen art. See also ART WORKS, supra note 11, at 1055-91.
For a discussion of attempts to control forgeries and national treasures acts, see id. at 527-
626. Great Britain recently intervened to prevent the exportation of the "Codex Leicester"
(DaVinci).
52. U.C.C. § 2-312 (1978). The statutory measure of damages is the difference between
the value at the time and place of delivery and the value the goods would have had had the
representation of title been valid. U.C.C. § 2-714(2) (1978). The prudent art investor may
nevertheless wish to insist on a covenant of title.
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A. Authenticity
The investment art purchaser must be convinced of the identity
of the piece, that it is the piece it is represented to be or the work
of the author to whom it is attributed.58 Until recently the ques-
tion of authenticity in a transaction was governed by the doctrine
of caveat emptor and common law fraud principles, under which
the investor bore the responsibility for his own protection. 54 One
means of self-protection is to seek independent authentication;
however, many experts are reluctant to perform authentications
for fear of liability."5 Further, where the ratio of the authentication
fees to the cost of the piece is disproportionate, the purchaser may
decide to just take the risk.56
In 1968, the New York legislature amended the General Business
Law to add a provision which makes an art merchant's representa-
tions as to authorship of art works part of the basis of the bar-
gain.5 7 The art merchant's representations are considered affirma-
tions of fact and therefore deemed to be express warranties.58 The
53. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 170.45 (McKinney 1975), which makes it a class A misde-
meanor to render any object so that it "appears to have an antiquity, rarity, source or au-
thorship which it does not in fact possess." Id.
54. An action in common law fraud was of limited effectiveness. Because of the require-
ment of scienter, merchants selling in good faith were not liable for fraud. See Restatement
of Torts § 526(b) (1938) and W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 177-80 (4th ed. 1971).
55. See Findlay v. Duthuit, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 10, 1980, at 3, col. 2 (New York art dealer
unsuccessfully sued Paris-based art expert for classifying as "fake" a Matisse sold by the
dealer for $260,000; no personal jurisdiction). See also N.Y.A. No. 4818 189th Sess. (1966), a
bill introduced but not enacted by the state legislature which would have provided a quali-
fied privilege for expressions of opinion relating to authenticity. The expert would have been
liable only in the event a work pronounced by him to be a forgery was later shown to be
authentic. For a discussion of this bill, see DESKBOOK, supra note 1, at 414-19.
56. "An art purchase often results from a buyer's sudden impulse; he does not pause to
obtain information relating to the property purchased or engage in the formalities common-
place in transactions involving other kinds of property of like value." DUFFv, supra note 6,
at 2.
57. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 219-c (McKinney Supp. 1979). Under § 219-c(2), the merchant
may select the appropriate terminology to indicate whether the piece is unequivocally the
work of a named author, attributed to a named author, or of the school of a named author,
as those terms are used in the trade.
58. The new section was intended to complement the warranty provision contained in
U.C.C. § 2-313 (1978). See Legislative Memorandum of Attorney General Relating to Article
12-D contained in ART WORKS, supra note 11, at 405-08. The commentary to the U.C.C.
provision indicates that whether a seller's affirmations of value were intended as a basis of
the bargain is a question of fact. U.C.C. § 2-313, commentary, Point 8. (1978).
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remedies of rescission or damages are available to the injured pur-
chaser, depending upon whether the warranty is construed as a
condition or as a covenant." Additionally, the General Business
Law makes it a class A misdemeanor for any person to falsely cer-
tify authenticity, whether orally or in writing.60
In Dawson v. Malina,1 an action was brought under the new
section 219-c to rescind the purchase of Chinese ceramics and
other art objects sold by a New York dealer . 2 The dealer attrib-
uted the ceramics, by oral representation and by a written bill of
sale, to various dynastic periods and traced their provenance. Sub-
sequent consultations with art scholars in New York and abroad
caused Dawson to question the accuracy of the attributions and
provenance.
Dawson argued that the warranty created by section 219-c re-
quired that the pieces conform in all respects to the dealer's de-
scriptions.63 The Dawson court granted rescission but refused this
stringent standard, requiring instead that the purchaser bear the
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the
dealer's representations were made without a reasonable basis in
fact. The court applied this lesser standard because the expert wit-
nesses called by both parties could not state unqualifiedly to which
period a piece belonged, reasoning that the defendant dealer's un-
guarded attributions therefore could not have been factually
based.' The Dawson court construed section 219-c as intended to
convert a dealer's statements, perhaps mere expressions of opinion
in other sales contexts, to express warranties. 8
Dawson also makes clear that a dealer's representations as to au-
thorship are directly related to the issue of value. The buyer relies
on the dealer's identification of the piece as a basis for his
59. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 419 n.23 (2d. ed. 1977).
60. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 219-i (McKinney Supp. 1979). A "certificate of authenticity"
is defined at § 219-h(c).
61. 463 F. Supp. 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). See Comment, Regulation of the New York Art
Market: Has the Legislature Painted Dealers into a Corner?, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 939
(1978). Dawson is the only case yet decided under § 219-c.
62. 463 F. Supp. at 463. Dawson bought eleven objects of Chinese art for a total
purchase price of $105,400. Id.
63. Id. at 465-66.
64. Id. at 467.
65. Id. at 470-71.
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purchase decision. The warranty in Dawson was construed as a
condition which if breached would justify rescission of the transac-
tion. In other instances, the warranty may be construed as a cove-
nant, with a breach of the express warranty to be remedied by
monetary damages. Depending on the facts surrounding the trans-
action, the damage award could be substantial. Such facts are pre-
sent when the dealer knows, for example, that the buyer intends to
resell in reliance upon the dealer's representations of present
value. It is conceivable, but probably unlikely, that section 219-c
could be construed to convert the dealer's representations of ap-
preciation potential to express warranties.
B. Present Value
Present value and appreciation potential of art work are concep-
tually distinct. The purchaser buying on the basis of perceived or
represented present value makes a non-speculative investment.
The purchaser buying on the basis of perceived or represented ap-
preciation potential makes a speculative investment.6 6 Each factor
alone or in combination may motivate a purchase.
Satisfaction of the piece's present value is governed to an extent
by section 219-c, but only to the extent that value is a natural con-
comitant of authenticity. The statute falls short of imposing any
affirmative duty on the seller not to overreach the buyer by de-
manding a price which, because of his superior market or other
knowledge, he knows to exceed the true value of the piece.
The common law recognizes that sales transactions frequently
occur between parties who lack equal knowledge concerning the
object of the sales contract or the market in which it is traded.e
This principle is well illustrated by transactions in corporate secur-
'ities. The policy which underlies the intricate body of securities
law is one of full and fair seller disclosure to the investing public."
66. In each art purchase one or the other factor may predominate. Regarding the trans-
actions enumerated in the preceding section, it will be noted that in the mail order offer the
speculative aspect predominates. The volume discount purchaser is attracted by a bargain
offer and calculates an immediately identifiable return represented by the disparity between
the purchase price and resale price. A simple repurchase option contains no inherent appre-
ciative gain. See note 153 infra.
67. See RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRAcTs § 472(b) (1932); 12 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 1497-
1499 (3d ed. 1970).
68. See notes 101-10 infra.
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It is obvious from the dollar value of the purchase successfully
rescinded in Dawson v. Malina that Dawson had significant advi-
sory and financial resources at his disposal, and thus could force
satisfaction from the seller. However, a considerable portion of the
increasingly profitable art business is comprised of purchases of
moderately priced works by persons who lack Dawson's resources.0 9
C. Information to Determine Value
Original prints70 are a good example of affordable art which has
enjoyed enthusiastic response from a broad-based buying public.
Two states have passed legislation71 to curb abuses predictably at-
tendant to lucrative sales, and similar legislation has been intro-
duced in the New York State Assembly.72 The justification for leg-
islative action, as described in the New York proposal, is the need
to enhance the buyer's opportunity to make a reasonable assess-
ment of the print's monetary value. 73 This need is met by requiring
seller disclosure of information relevant to the print's uniqueness
and scarcity.7 4 The New York proposal specifically acknowledges
that the art merchant is typically in a position to know much more
about the work than the investor.7 ' To correct this imbalance, the
69. "[C]ollecting valuable objects is no longer the preserve of the rich. At Sotheby's Los
Angeles branch, which recorded a 1978-79 turnover of $13.7 million, 50% of all items on sale
go for less than $300." IME, Dec. 31, 1979, at 50.
70. The general requirements of an original print are: (1) that the artist alone created
the master plate or woodblock, (2) that the reproduction ("pulling") was supervised by the
artist, and (3) that the finished print was approved by the artist. See What is an Original
Print? (Principles Recommended by the Print Council of America) ART WORKS, supra note
11, at 441.
71. California, CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1740-1745 (West 1973) and Illinois, Ill. Sales Code §§
361-369 (Smith Hurd Supp. 1972). The laws are similar in that each requires identical dis-
closure and provides for treble damages or fines for violation. The Illinois act, however,
excludes prints sold by the artist and applies both to wholesale and retail sales. The effort
to pass federal legislation in this area has proven unsuccessful. See ART WORKS, supra note
11, at 411-35, including an exchange of memoranda between the bill's draftsman and the Art
Dealers' Association.
72. N.Y.A. No. 10809, 203d Sess. (1980). This bill was preceded by the N.Y. City Con-
sumer Protection Law, Regulation 30, which prohibits the deceptive labeling of posters as
"limited editions." This deceptive practice would presumably be prosecuted under the New
York Martin Act. See notes 128-32 infra. The bill would amend the New York General
Business Law by adding a new section 222.
73. Memorandum in Support of N.Y.A. No. 10809, 203d Sess. (1980).
74. Id.
75. N.Y.A. 10809, § 1 Legislative Findings and Intent.
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bill itemizes informational details which must be provided by the
seller, including: the artist's identity, the size, date and number of
editions, the medium used, whether the artist oversaw or approved
production, whether each print is hand signed, and whether the
plate is still employable.7 6 The affirmation of any of these factual
details constitutes an express warranty within the meaning of sec-
tion 219-c of the General Business Law."
The merchant may disclaim knowledge of any detail, but a dis-
claimer is ineffective absent a showing that the information was
not ascertainable despite reasonable inquiries. Rescission and resti-
tution or damage relief is available to the purchaser if the seller
fails to supply the information or supplies erroneous information. 8
The buyer may recover treble damages from the dealer who
wilfully withholds, falsely supplies or falsely disclaims knowledge
of the relevant information.79
The proposed statute expressly acknowledges as its model the
law governing investments in corporate securities." Its policy is
identical to the policy of full and fair disclosure embodied in the
laws governing securities transactions. The monetary value of a
print is measured by its uniqueness and scarcity."' The disclosure
mandated under the print legislation is designed to shield the pur-
chaser against deceptive use of photographic reproductions and
misleading numbering schemes. Similar disclosure requirements
for the sale of one of a kind paintings and sculptures have not been
legislated, but guidelines for the content of such legislation can be
modelled on Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") procedures."
76. Id. § 222(1)-(14).
77. Id. § 223(1)-(2).
78. Id. § 225(1).
79. Id. § 225(3). The proposed bill also authorizes the state attorney general to seek
injunctions or fines in cases of repeated violations. Id. § 226.
80. Memorandum in Support of N.Y.A. 10809, 203d Sess. (1980).
81. See F. FELDMAN & S. WEIL, supra note 25, at 615-21, criticizing the uniqueness and
scarcity standard as an inaccurate measure of the value of a print.
82. See Rev. Proc. 66-49 § 3.03, 1966-2 C.B. 1257-59.
An example of the kind of data which should be contained in a typical appraisal is
included below. This relates to the valuation of art objects, but a similarly detailed
breakdown can be outlined for any type of property. Appraisals of art objects, paint-
ings in particular, should include:
(1) A complete description of the object, indicating the size, the subject matter,




In 1968, the IRS assembled an Art Advisory Panel to aid it in
reviewing deductions claimed by taxpayers for donated art proper-
ties. The IRS requires that the asserted fair market value of the
donated piece be substantiated. Substantiation can be achieved
only through disclosure of the economic state of the relevant mar-
ket and the artist's standing within that market.8 3 The IRS points
out that evidence of the actual sales price is unpersuasive absent a
showing that the parties were fully informed as to all relevant
facts. 4 The factors reviewed by the IRS are general enough to per-
mit their application to sales in most art media. A disclosure by
the seller of these facts would help to close the gap between the
knowledge possessed by the art merchant and the typically lesser
knowledge of the art purchaser.
Perhaps fair dealing would be encouraged if art merchants were
subjected to sanctions within their own community. Art dealers
may complain, however, that the sheer -diversity of art merchants,
which is a function of variances in type and price of art properties,
does not readily lend itself to a uniform code of professional ethics
enforced by membership suspension or other public disapproval.
However, absent a professional sanctioning mechanism, a dealer
may quietly refund the purchase price to a dissatisfied buyer with-
out significant adverse effect on the dealer's reputation. Unfortu-
nately, the dealer may refuse altogether to refund the purchase
(2) The cost, date and manner of acquisition.
(3) A history of the item including proof of authenticity such as a certificate of
authentication if such exists.
(4) A photograph of a size and quality fully identifying the subject matter,
preferably a 10" x 12" or larger print.
Id.
83. See Rev. Proc. 66-49 § 3.03(5), which provides in part:
(5) A statement of the factors upon which the appraisal is based, such as:
(a) Sales of other works by the same artist particularly on or around the valua-
tion date.
(b) Quoted prices in dealers' catalogs of the artist's works or of other artists of
comparable stature.
(c) The economic state of the art market at or around the time of valuation,
particularly with respect to the specific property.
(d) A record of any exhibitions at which the particular art object has been
displayed.
(e) A statement as to the standing of the artist in his profession and in the
particular school or time period.
84. Rev. Proc. 66-49 § 2.05 (1966).
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price of a minor work valued at just a few hundred dollars for the
reason that frequent rescissions are not conducive to smooth busi-
ness operations. The unfair burden then falls on the buyer to ex-
pend time, money and aggravation in litigation or to simply keep
the unwanted or overpriced work.
D. Appreciation Potential
Art properties, like corporate shares and other investment vehi-
cles, are traded on a fluctuating market. As brokers or dealers of
corporate securities analyze trends on the stock market, so are sig-
nals of trends in market performance discernible by experts in the
art market. Analogs to the predictions of broker-dealers or to in-
side tips can be discerned.8 5 In the context of this examination of
the art market, a purchase made expressly with a view to apprecia-
tion potential has been characterized as a speculative investment.
As a practical matter, however, some consideration of appreciation
potential likely accompanies most art purchases, if only as the in-
evitable result of the widely publicized rise in art prices
generally."6
Seller representations of appreciation potential are explicit in
the case of the mail order prints and the guaranteed investment
collection gallery offe. 87 Moreover, buyers are invited to rely on
the representations as deriving from expert knowledge. It appears
to be axiomatic among reputable gallery dealers that representa-
tions of appreciation potential are inappropriate."e The recognition
of the conflict which inheres between the selling and advisory func-
tions probably dictates the restraint of these dealers. However,
even a comment on an artist's recent sales gains could be inter-
preted by the purchaser as a representation of appreciation poten-
tial. It may frequently be difficult to ascertain whether such seller
representations induced the purchase, and the extent to which the
85. A merger or acquisition may affect the value of a corporate share, embargoes or the
discovery of a new lode will affect the price of diamonds, and museum acquisitions or pri-
vate trading may affect the value of a work of art.
86. "For the past 15 years or so, collectors, dealers, auction houses and their willing
accomplices, journalists, have been moved to pleasure, then wonder, and now to a sort of
popeyed awe at the upward movement of art prices. ; . . [Ilts present function is to become
a new type of bullion." Hughes, supra note 2, at 56.
87. See text accompanying notes 27-42 supra.
88. See J. MERRYMAN & C. ELSEN, 2 LAW, ETHICS AND THE VISUAL ARTS 6-2 (1979).
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buyer relied on the representations as a basis of the bargain.
Unfortunately, while a purchase may be actively induced in most
cases, current law abandons the dissatisfied buyer to an uncertain
remedy. 9 Recourse beyond the harsh doctrine of caveat emptor
and common law fraud principles in the purchase and sale of art
properties is appropriate.90 The law imposes no duty on the art
merchant to correct a purchaser's inaccurate notions of a work's
future value, although an art advisor consulted for his expertise
would likely bear such a duty as a natural concomitant of his
agency function. 1
It is evident that the investor in art properties occupies a precar-
ious position within the market, and must frequently rely on per-
sons whose interests may be adverse to his own. The investor's dis-
advantage has been little improved by piecemeal legislative
solutions which, while modelled on the legal principles governing
other investment markets, cannot be effectively exploited. The
protective mechanisms employed in the securities investment mar-
ket, and their underlying policies, are surveyed in the next section
with a view to their application to art investments.
IV. Traditional Investment Markets
The investment vehicles most familiar to the public are corpo-
rate stocks and bonds." The shareholder, like any investor, com-
mits funds to a purchase with the expectation that the investment
89. See note 67 supra.
90. See note 54 supra.
91. When the principal employs an agent, the law presumes that he does so in order
to secure to himself the benefits of the agent's skill, experience or discretion, and to
reap the fruits of the performance of the undertaking. The law presumes that he
expects-and it gives him the right to expect-that the agent so employed will en-
deavor to further the principal's interests, and will use his powers for the principal's
benefit.
F. MECHEM, LAW OF AGENCY § 500 (4th ed. 1952). The agent has a duty to give the principal
notice of all material facts which come to his knowledge. Id. § 541.
92. "The most common feature of stock is the right to receive dividends contingent upon
an apportionment of profits." Tcherephrin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 339 (1967). Securities
may also take the form of limited partnership interests in oil and gas ventures, see, e.g.,
Bayoud v. Ballard, 404 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Tex. 1975), promissory notes in some contexts, El
Khadem v. Equity Securities Corp., 494 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900
(1974), and fur-bearing animal breeding, Miller v. Central Chinchilla Group, Inc., 494 F.2d
414 (8th Cir. 1974) (chinchillas); Kemmerer v. Weaver, 445 F.2d 76 (7th Cir. 1971) (beavers).
In such instances an investment contract is present. See discussion at notes 176-85 infra.
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will return a profit as the result of the efforts of someone other
than himself.S" Securities which meet certain criteria may be listed
for trading on a major exchange.94 These central exchanges are
continuous auction markets in which a buyer or seller can execute
transactions through members of the exchange. 5 Price information
is available to all traders through a uniform quotation system."
Unlisted securities or odd lots are traded over the counter by
members of the National Association of Securities Dealers.'7 New
issues are usually promoted through the sales efforts of a single
market-maker'" in much the same manner as the exclusive art
dealer or distributor promotes artists. 9
A. Investor Protection through Regulation
It is the fundamental purpose of the body of laws which govern
securities transactions to protect the investing public. This goal is
93. See In re National Resources Corp., 8 S.E.C. 635 (1941). "[T]ransactions which, in
form, appear to involve nothing more than the sale of real estate, chattels, or services, have
been held to be investment contracts where, in substance, they involve the laying out of
money by the investor on the assumption and expectation that the investment will return a
profit without any active effort on his part, but rather as the result of the efforts of someone
else." Id. at 637.
94. The criteria are set by the individual exchanges. The New York Stock Exchange, for
example, requires that minimum numerical standards be met for shares held and market
value. The securities must, of course, also be registered. See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE,
INC., CONSTITUTION AND RULES, 11 2495A-F (1972). The advantages of listing are discussed in
3 BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 3.09[3] (rev. ed. 1980) [herein-
after cited as BLOOMENTHAL].
95. H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW IN PERSPECTIVE, § 3.02 at 12 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as PERSPECTIVE].
96. Composite tapes and an electronic quotation system implemented in 1977 permit the
broker or dealer to determine the best market in which to execute customer orders. Id. §
3.04 at 15-16. Unlisted securities or odd lots are traded over the counter by members of the
National Association of Securities Dealers. Id. § 1.02 at 2. Quotations for these markets are
also available electronically or through "pink sheets." Id. at 14. See also notes 136-37 infra
discussing the duties of exchanges as mandated by federal securities law.
97. The market-making situation "seeps with potential for securities violations." 3B
BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 94, § 12.04[2). See also PERSPECTIVE, supra note 95, § 3.02 at 13.
Although in theory the customer in OTC sales determines whether a broker/dealer is to act
as his agent or as a principal, the broker/dealer often controls the capacity in which it acts.
A broker/dealer acting as principal need not disclose its markup, but under principles devel-
oped by the SEC and the NASD, the markup must be a reasonable one. Id. § 3.03 at 15,
(citing Charles Hughes & Co. v. Securities & Exchange Comm'n, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir
1949)).
98. See notes 122-25 infra and accompanying text.
99. See text accompanying notes 17-18 supra.
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achieved through three distinct types of regulatory devices. These
devices are: 1) pre-offer registration of securities, 2) antifraud pro-
visions, and 3) the registration of traders and advisors.10o
1. Disclosure: The Securities Act of 1933
Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933101 (the "1933 Act")
with the aim of "restor[ing] the confidence of the prospective pur-
chaser in his ability to select sound securities. ' 1 The 1933 Act
broadly defines what constitutes a "security."' 103 The philosophy of
the legislation is emphatically one of full and fair disclosure by the
seller.10 The harsh doctrine of caveat emptor is replaced by a pro-
cedural framework which enables the prospective investor to make
an informed investment decision.
The Securities and Exchange Commission is the government
agency charged with the administration and enforcement of the
statute, and has substantial rule-making, 05 investigative and sanc-
tioning authority.'" The SEC issues public policy statements in
100. L. Loss, 1 SECURITIE REGULATiONS 33-34 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as 1
Loss]. Offers may be made, but not accepted.
101. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a. (1976).
102. S. Rep. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933). Addressing Congress on the proposed
legislation, President Roosevelt stated, "[TIhis proposal adds to the ancient rule of caveat
emptor, the further doctrine 'let the seller also beware'. It puts the burden of telling the
whole truth on the seller. It should give impetus to honest dealings in securities and thereby
bring back public confidence." See 1 Loss, supra note 100, at 126. See also Wilko v. Swan,
346 U.S. 427, 430-31 (1953).
103. The term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evi-
dence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement, collateral trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, voting trust certificate, certificate of deposit
for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in
general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security', or any certificate
of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guar-
antee *of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or to purchase, any of the foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1976). "In defining the word 'security', Congress intended to include all
interstate transactions which were the legitimate subject of its regulation." Llanos v. United
States, 206 F.2d 852, 854 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 923 (1954).
104. See Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979).
105. 15 U.S.C. § 77s (1976). Examples of the SEC's rulemaking power are the Rules
governing proxy solicitation (Rules 14a-1 through 14a-12, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 - .14a-12
(1978)), Rule 146 regarding exemptions from registration, and Rule 10b-5 implementing the
antifraud provision of the 1934 Act. See note 117 infra and accompanying text. See also
Woolley v. United States, 97 F.2d 258 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 614 (1938).
106. See, e.g., Fink v. Securities & Exchange Comm'n, 417 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir. 1969) (life-
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the form of releases, interpretive letters, and "no-action" letters.07
The registration statement and offering prospectus required to
be filed for review by the SEC108 describe the scope and method of
the offering, the security or interest offered and the business deal-
ings of the corporate issuer and its key personnel. 10 9 Financial
statements and advertising must also be filed. No sales may be ef-
fected pending SEC approval.110
2. Exemptions
Non-public offerings are exempt from the registration require-
time bar against registered representative). See also N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1980, at D14, col. 1;
N.Y.L.J., Oct. 15, 1980, at 1, col. 5.
107. "No-action" letters are issued in response to written inquiries from private counsel
relating to proposed transactions. The facts surrounding the offer are set out, ordinarily
with an opinion of counsel that the offering does not constitute the offer of a security within
the meaning of § 2(1) of the 1933 Act. The SEC staff in a reply letter indicates whether
enforcement action will be recommended. Such position statements have no legal authority,
as is typically pointed out by the SEC:
Because this position is based upon the representations made to the Division in
your letter, it should be noted that any different facts or conditions might require a
different conclusion. Further, this letter only expresses the Division's position on en-
forcement action and does not purport to express any legal conclusion on the ques-
tion presented.
The above cautionary statement appears in every reply letter.
108. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976).
109. See PERSPECTivE, supra note 95, § 5.06; 3A BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 94, §§ 7.08,
7.09. More specifically, these items are listed as (1) statement of proposed use of proceeds;
(2) table of debt and equity securities; (3) list of underwriters; (4) five-year profit and loss
statement; (5) five-year history of business operations; (6) description of relevant physical
properties; (7) organization and principal shareholders, § 16-type transactions; (8)
threatened or pending litigation; (9) description of security (voting, non-voting, etc.); and
(10) detailed information concerning directors, including five-year history of business expe-
rience, age, remuneration and shareholdings or options. Id.
110. The waiting period is ordinarily 20 days. The SEC reviews all these materials for
their completeness and accuracy, and notes any deficiencies requiring amendment. See 15
U.S.C. § 77h (1976). A "stop-order" may enjoin the issue. Id. § 77h(d). See also 1 Loss,
supra note 100, at 180. The enforcement sections 11 and 12 encourage careful preparation of
the registration statement and prospectus. The registrant is liable to purchasers for false or
misleading statements contained in or omissions from the offering documents. See Escott v.
Barchris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), holding that such statements are
those which if correctly stated or disclosed would have deterred or tended to deter the aver-
age prudent investor from purchasing the securities in question. The offeror of securities in
violation of § 5 is liable to purchasers of the unregistered securities. A general remedy is
provided for defrauded purchasers. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1) (1976). The clear policy of the Secur-
ities Act of 1933 is to assure the availability to purchasers of basic, reliable information in
advance of sale. The investor should gain a fair picture of both affirmative and negative
factors. See Adato v. Kagan, 599 F.2d 1111, 1115-16 (2d Cir. 1979).
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ments of the 1933 Act on the theory that the public benefits to be
derived from registration are too remote to justify the filing bur-
dens.' The offerees, however, must be "persons able to fend for
themselves." The ability to fend for oneself depends on two fac-
tors: 1) access to the same kind of information as that which would
be disclosed in a registration statement and 2) the sophistication of
the offerees. 112 Although the actual number of offerees is not deter-
minative, an SEC rule assures an exemption for offers made to
small groups of thirty-five or fewer," s provided the offerees do not
purchase for resale." 4
111. 1 Loss, supra note 100, at 653. Exempt transactions must be distinguished from
exempt securities. Id. at 708. See also J.W. HICKS, EXEMPTED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE SE-
CURITIES ACT OF 1933, § 1.01[3] (1st ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as HICKS]. The enumerated
exemptions are contained in sections 3 and 4 of the 1933 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77c, d (1976). Any
exemption from the requirement of § 5 registration must be strictly construed. See Securi-
ties & Exchange Comm'n v. Aaron, 605 F.2d 612, 618 (2d Cir. 1979), vacated in part and
remanded, 100 S.Ct. 1945 (1980). Exclusively intrastate offerings are exempt. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 7 7c(a)(11) (1976) and Rule 147, 17 C.F.R. § 240.147 (1978). All offerees must be bona fide
residents; a single non-resident offeree will destroy eligibility. See PERSPECTIVE, supra note
95, at 34-39. A third category of exemption is available for relatively small dollar volume
offers. See Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251 - .263 (1978). "Notification" must still be
filed, and the procedure is sometimes termed a "mini-registration." See 3A BLOOMENTHAL,
supra note 94 §§ 5.01-.16.
112. See Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 126 (1953);
3 BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 94 § 4.05[5]. See generally HICKS, supra note 111.
113. Rule 146, 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1978). The offer to'a single person may constitute a
public offering. Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. at 125. An
offering to diverse and unrelated groups would have the appearance of being public. See
Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). The thirty-five person limit may
not be thwarted by successive offers to groups of thirty-five, since such offers may be
deemed "integrated" and the offeree number therefore counted in the aggregate. See Securi-
ties Act Release No. 4552 (1962), listing five factors to be applied in testing for integration:
(1) whether the different offerings are part of a single plan of financing; (2) whether the
offerings involve the issuance of the same class of security; (3) whether the offerings are
made at pbout the same time; (4) whether the same type of consideration is to be received;
and (5) whether the offerings are made for the same general purpose. For a no-action letter
response denying application of Rule 146, see Photographic Artists, Ltd., note 212 infra and
accompanying text.
114. It is common practice to have buyers present a letter stating that the purchase is
not intended for resale. 1 Loss, supra note 100, at 665. The mere holding of the asset to
obtain capital gains treatment or to profit from a market rise does not afford a statutory
basis for the exemption. Id. at 668-69 (citing Securities Act Releases Nos. 3825 (1957) and
4164 (1959)). See also notes 43-45 supra (relating to the art market and to the offering in
Art Appraisers of America). The Rule 146 exemption is frequently exploited in connection
with tax shelter offerings. PERsPEcTiE, supra note 95, § 6.01. In Art Appraisers of America,
some investors purchased for tax benefits, others for resale.
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As dictated by the policy of protective disclosure to investors,
the Commission may revoke exemptions at any time.1 ' Moreover,
exemption does not immunize any offer or its offerors from liabil-
ity under the antifraud provisions contained in section 17 of the
1933 Act and in section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.
3. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
The heart of the 1934 Act 16 is the antifraud provision contained
in section 10b as implemented by Rule 10b-5. 11 The purpose of
the provision is to ensure fairness in the purchase and sale of se-
curities.118 Any transaction effected by means of deception, manip-
ulation or fraud violates this protective policy. The provision goes
beyond the dictates of sections eleven, twelve and seventeen of the
1933 Act, which prohibits misstatements or omissions in filing doc-
uments, by prohibiting all misleading statements of material fact
made in connection with the transaction. A material fact may be
any information which might influence the investment decision of
the reasonable investor." 9 The provision has been construed as in-
tending to relax the common law fraud standard in order to effec-
115. See 1 Loss, supra note 100, at 626 (citing examples of grounds for revocation, such
as prior convictions and materially misleading information).
116. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1976).
117. Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any na-
tional securities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1978).
118. "Rule 10b-5 was promulgated ... to prevent inequitable and unfair practices and
to insure fairness in securities transactions generally, whether conducted face-to-face, over
the counter, or on exchanges." Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401
F.2d 833, 847-48 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976, rehearing denied, 404 U.S. 1064
(1969).
119. Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 470 F. Supp. 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Weitzman
v. Stein, 428 F. Supp. 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Berkowitz v. Baron, 428 F. Supp. 1190 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); West v. Zuhorst, 280 F. Supp. 574 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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tuate the statute's remedial tenets.120
In the context of an art transaction, a statement of material fact
could be any representation as to authorship, present value or ap-
preciation potential made by the seller. Rule 10b-5 would impose
liability on the seller for misleading the purchaser as to any of
these elements of the bargain. Further, because Rule 10b-5 was
designed to ensure that all investors trade on an equal footing,'12 if
applied to art transactions it might impose an affirmative duty on
the dealer to disclose material facts solely within his superior
knowledge.
B. Regulation of Traders
To protect the investing public against unqualified or unscrupu-
lous traders, broker-dealers are required under section 15(a) of the
1934 Act to register with the SEC. 122 To ensure fair trading prac-
tices, the antifraud provisions of section 10b are extended to bro-
ker-dealers under sections 15(c)1 and 2.123 Also, the SEC has inde-
pendent sanctioning and investigative powers under the 1934 Act
to ensure fair trading practices.
The broker trades in securities as agent for his customers but
120. See Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082
(2d Cir. 1972); but see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, rehearing denied, 425
U.S. 986 (1976); Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Aaron, 100 S. Ct. 1945 (1980) (SEC re-
quired to establish scienter as an element of a civil enforcement action to enjoin violation of
§ 10b). A private right of action under § 10b was implied soon after its promulgation. See,
e.g., Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
121. "The core of Rule 10b-5 is the implementation of the Congressional purpose that all
investors should have equal access to the rewards of participation in securities transactions.
It was the intent of Congress that all members of the investing public should be subject to
identical market risks, which market risks include, of course, the risk that one's evaluative
capacity or one's capital available to put at risk may exceed another's capacity or capital."
Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d at 851-52.
122. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a) (1976). The information elicited through registration relates to
educational background, past business dealings and any prior misconduct. The registrant
submits to the jurisdiction of the Commission once application is made. Blaise D'Antoni &
Associates, Inc. v. Securities & Exchange Comm'n, 290 F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1961). "Registra-
tion is intended to prevent fraudulent or unqualified persons from entering the securities
business, to supervise their activities once registration has been achieved, and to remove
them from registration if they fall below any of the statutory standards." 1 Loss supra, note
100, at 34.
123. See, e.g., Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. R.A. Holman & Co., 377 F.2d 665 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 991 (1967). A private right of action is implied under these
sections. Davis v. Arco Corp., 371 F. Supp. 782 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (failure to register); Maher
v. J.R. Williston & Beane, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (deceptive device).
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the dealer trades as principal for his own account. Confusion may
sometimes arise because the broker's professional obligation to his
client may conflict with the dealer's personal interests. The broker-
dealer must make full disclosure to his customers of possible con-
flicts or other material facts or face liability under the relevant
provisions of the Act."24 The broker-dealer is barred from over-
reaching his client, and prohibited from charging excessive prices,
making unfounded recommendations, and recommending securi-
ties for purchase not suitable for the particular customer.2 '
The art purchaser who may be similarly confused when a dealer
acts in the dual capacity of advisor and seller enjoys no similar
protections. Also, the buyer who seeks rescission asserting that an
art purchase is not "worth" the price paid, may have a valid but
incognizable claim.
1. Investment Advisers Act of 1940
The Investment Advisers Act ("Adviser Act") contains a system
of registration and regulation of investment advisers comparable to
that contained in the 1934 Act for broker-dealers. 26 An investment
adviser may be anyone who advises others, either by personal con-
sultation or through publications, as to the value of securities or
124. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(5) (1976). See also notes 105, 106 supra. See, e.g., Hanley v.
Securities & Exchange Comm'n, 415 F.2d 582 (2d Cir. 1969) (holding that a dealer warrants
to his customers that his recommendations are well-founded). Id. at 596-97. Disclosure must
be made on the dealer's own initiative, not just upon request. Hughes v. Securities & Ex-
change Comm'n, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
125. See generally Charles Hughes & Co. v. Securities & Exchange Comm'n, 139 F.2d
434 (2d Cir. 1943); PERSPECTIVE, supra note 95, § 21.02 and cases cited therein. Examples of
other prohibited practices are "churning" and "scalping." Churning occurs when the broker/
dealer is the sole or dominant market maker in a particular security and does not make full
disclosure of the nature of the market, or where he causes transactions for his customer's
account which are excessive in view of the financial resources or character of the account.
See, e.g., Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1975); Faturik v. Woodmere Securities,
Inc., 442 F. Supp. 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Scalping occurs when the broker/dealer recommends
the purchase of a security without disclosing a practice of purchasing such securities before
making the recommendation and then selling these at a profit when prices rise. See, e.g.,
Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
126. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b. (1976) "[Cllients of investment
advisers rely as heavily on their investment advisers as clients of broker-dealers rely on
broker-dealers. . . . [A]dvisory clients are entitled to similar protections with respect to the
competence of advisers with whom they deal." Ahart, Suggested Amendments to the In-
vestment Advisers Act, 6 SEC REG. L.J. 226, 229 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Ahart]. Advis-
ers are subject to § 10b and to SEC sanctions. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976).
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who makes recommendations as to their purchase or sale. 27 In this
way, the investment adviser performs a function identical to that
of advisors in the art market.
2. New York State Securities Laws
Transactions in securities within New York State are regulated
by the Martin Act. 128 Commonly referred to as a "fraud act"'129 be-
cause of its reduced emphasis on filing requirements, the purpose
of the Martin Act is to defeat all "unsubstantial and visionary
schemes" to fraudulently exploit the public. 130 The state attorney
general has wide discretionary powers under the Act to investigate
offerings, to issue subpoenas 31 and to seek injunctions. 32
127. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 202(a)11, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(11) (1976). See gen-
erally 2 Loss, supra note 100, at 1392-1416. A fixed subscription price for uniform publica-
tions may satisfy the compensation requirement. Id. at 1410. The registration form requires
information regarding the basis of the adviser's compensation (may not be a percentage of
client's profits), his education, and business affiliations. Exemption from registration is
available, where the advisory functions are strictly intrastate, confined to fewer than fifteen
clients annually, and the adviser does not hold himself out to the public as an adviser
(termed "shingling"). 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b) (1976). See also note 46 supra. A private right of
action for damages suffered due to an investment adviser's misrepresentation of material
facts or other violation of the securities laws is implied under the 1940 Act. See, e.g.
Agrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 872-73 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905
(1978); Sullivan v. Chase Inv. Servs., Inc., 434 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1977). For a circuit
court decision holding that injunctive relief is also available, see Lewis v. Transamerica
Corp., 575 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1978), modified sub. nom. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors,
Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) (holding that the investor may only void the advisory
contract). Ahart, supra note 126, at 232-33, suggests that the distinction heretofore made
between those primarily engaged in the advisory business and those not so engaged be elimi-
nated, particularly requiring registration in those instances where the adviser has a substan-
tial share of the market. Ahart favors reimbursement by advisers of lost profits to clients
acting on investment advice. Id.
128. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352 (McKinney 1968).
129. "New York's Martin Act, passed in 1921, was supplemented in 1932 by very simple
filing provisions. . . . But it, too, is commonly referred to as a fraud act and it falls prima-
rily in that category." 1 Loss, supra note 100, at 36.
130. People v. Federated Radio Corp., 244 N.Y. 33, 38, 154 N.E. 655, 657, 214 N.Y.S.
670, 672 (1926).
131. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-i (McKinney 1968). Refusal to testify if subpoenaed con-
stitutes prima facie proof of fraudulent practices. Id. § 353(1) (McKinney 1968).
132. Id. § 352(1). The Martin Act is designed to monitor traders in securities rather than
to pass on the merits of the securities themselves. Thus, securities listed on exchanges lo-
cated in New York are exempted from individual state registration. Id. § 359-f(1). Exemp-
tions are available for all securities sold in a limited offer to forty or fewer persons and for
other offers upon application to the attorney general. Id. §§ 359-f(2), (d). See also notes 112-
14 supra and accompanying text.
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3. Self-Regulation of Traders
Most writers in the securities field recognize the value of self-
regulation.'33 The provisions on registration, prevention and pun-
ishment of fraudulent practices furnish a foundation for control.
However, these must be supplemented by regulation on an ethical
plane. Unfair practices by the submarginal element in any indus-
try, while technically not illegal, tend to undermine the entire mar-
ket. Ethical practices within the industry must be ensured through
substantial self-regulation properly supervised by government. 34
Provision is made in the 1934 Act for the registration, regulation
and supervision of national exchanges. 1 5 The exchanges must by
Congressional mandate promulgate internal rules designed to pre-
vent fraudulent and manipulative acts and to promote "just and
equitable principles of trade."' 6 In compliance with this mandate,
the New York Stock Exchange and the National Association of Se-
curities Dealers maintain strict membership standards and an in-
ternal disciplinary system.'37 Moreover, both trade organizations
provide recourse to the investing public before professional arbi-
The registration requirements under the Martin Act are comparatively simple. Brokers
and dealers must file a broker-dealer statement every four years. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 359-
e(c) (McKinney 1968). The statement contains the usual information relating to business
history, criminal record and educational background. Id. § 359-e(3)(a) (McKinney 1968). It
is deemed filed when received by the office of the attorney general. Id. § 359-e(9) (McKin-
ney 1968). Investment advisers selling advisory services to more than forty persons in the
state must file a yearly investment adviser statement. Id. § 359-eee(2), (3), (4) (McKinney
1968). The definition of "investment adviser" is substantially identical to that contained in
the 1940 Act; Copies of prospectuses, sales literature and client solicitations intended for
general distribution must also be filed. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 359-eee(8) (McKinney 1968).
A misdemeanor penalty is imposed for false statements of material fact contained in any
filed document. Id. § 359-e(6) (McKinney 1968). Failure to file any required statement is
also punishable as a misdemeanor, however, such failure does not void the transaction. See
Sajor v. Ampol, Inc. 275 N.Y. 125, 9 N.1.2d 803 (1937).
133. See, e.g., 2 Loss, supra note 100, at 1361. See also Cheek, Professional Responsibil-
ity and Self-Regulation of the Securities Lawyers, 8 SEC. L. REV. 481 (1976).
134. 2 Loss, supra note 100, at 1361.
135. 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1976).
136. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (1976). See also 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-3 (1978).
137. See, e.g., N.Y. Stock Exchange Rules 308, 345.16 (1980). Arbitration principles as
applied to NYSE proceedings retain their fundamental character while acknowledging a pol-
icy of promoting internal harmony through the out-of-court resolution of disputes. Coenen
v. Pressprich, 453 F.2d 1209, 1212 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 949 (1972). See also N.Y.
Stock Exchange Rule 600(a) (1980); Reiner v. Scandinavian, N.Y.L.J., July 28, 1980, at 1,
col. 3 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
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tration panels for the effective settlement of disputes. The dispa-
rate trade organizations which presently exist in the art industry,
while dedicated to increasing the stature of art dealers and to en-
couraging ethical precepts, exercise no uniform sanctioning power
over their members. 38
V. Art as Security
The definition of a "security" contained in the 1933 Act includes
the form of security known as an "investment contract."' 39 In test-
ing for the presence of an investment contract, courts have focused
on the means and terms of the transaction, rather than on the sub-
ject of the contract. For a transaction in art properties to be con-
sidered to be a security, the transaction would probably have to
take the form of an investment contract.
In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Joiner Leasing
Corp., 40 a leasing corporation undertook to raise the $5,000-10,000
capital necessary for an oil drilling operation' 4 ' by offering to sell
surrounding land parcels to purchasers it solicited by mail." 2 Pur-
chasers were assured that the defendant would be fully responsible
for developing the site.' The advertising literature characterized
the purchase as a lucrative investment and as a participation in an
enterprise.1 44 The Supreme Court held that the offering consti-
138. See DESKBOOK, supra note 1, at 473-75.
139. See note 103 supra. The term has no statutory definition, but it has withstood con-
stitutional challenge on the grounds of vagueness. See, e.g., Securities & Exchange Comm'n
v. Brigadoon Scotch Distributing Co., 480 F.2d 1047, 1052 n.6 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 915 (1974).
140. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
141. Id. at 348 n.5.
142. Id. at 346.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 352-53. Some footnoted extracts from the advertising literature are of
interest.
[W]e are submitting this proposition to you in language that will appeal to business
people who are interested in making an investment where they have a good chance
for splendid returns on the investment. . . . I know you would like the thrill that
comes to those owning a lease around a producing well. . . .Fortunes in oil go to
those who invest. We believe you should invest here and now!
Id. at 346-47 n.3. The literature also contained a statement by the promoters that the secur-
ities offered were believed to be exempted from registration. The Court noted that the offer-
ings had to be securities in order to be exempt securities. Id. See notes 111-14 supra and
accompanying text for discussion of test applicable to exempted transactions. See also notes
43-45 supra and accompanying text.
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tuted an investment contract and therefore a security. In so doing,
the Court pointed out that the nature of the assets supporting the
investment was irrelevant. The test was "what character the in-
strument is given in commerce by the terms of the offer, the plan
of distribution, and the economic inducements held out to the
prospect. ' 145 The Court emphasized that the securities laws were
remedial and should be broadly construed to effect their underly-
ing policy of investor protection. Thus, "it [was] not inappropriate
that the promoters' offerings be judged as being what they were
represented to be."1 6
Two important factual elements led to the Court's decision.
First, the defendants' prognoses of future riches for a nominal in-
vestment (twenty-five dollars or less) represented a persuasive eco-
nomic inducement to invest. The sales offer was cast as a solicita-
tion to investors, not mere purchasers. 147 Second, the appeal of the
offer was greatly enhanced by the defendants' undertaking to gen-
erate profits by drilling. The plan of distribution contemplated an
apportioned share of profits to be produced by the defendants on
the site through facilities and skills possessed exclusively by
them. 141
The Joiner Court made explicit that the nature of the invest-
ment property, that is, the subject of the contract, was irrelevant.
It was the manner of the offering which permitted its characteriza-
tion as an investment contract. 14 9 It follows from Joiner that art
properties offered pursuant to an investment scheme may fall
within the purview of the 1933 Act though the form of the invest-
ment is dissimilar from other more familiar securities offerings
such as an oil leasehold or a share of corporate stock. The sub-
stance, not the form, of the offering is the measure of its vulnera-
bility to securities regulation.150
145. Id. at 352-53.
146. Id. at 353.
147. Id. at 348-49. Defendants were not, as a practical matter, offering naked leasehold
rights.
148. Id. at 348. "[Tjhe undertaking to drill a well runs through the whole transaction as
the thread on which everybody's beads were strung." Id.
149. Id. at 352-53.
150. [Tlhe reach of the Act does not stop with the obvious and commonplace. Novel,
uncommon or irregular devices, whatever they appear to be, are also reached if it be
proved as a matter of fact that they were widely offered or dealt in under terms or
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The factors emphasized by the Court in Joiner were later formu-
lated more clearly in Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Howey Co.. " ' In Howey, defendant offered unit plots of a Florida
citrus grove for sale to public investors and promised substantial
profits. An ancillary service contract provided for cultivation by
the offeror with the net proceeds to be distributed to the individ-
ual investors.152 The Supreme Court recognized that the arrange-
ment was more than an ordinary real estate sale providing for
seller management. The purchase price was a capital contribution
to a business venture from which the investor expected substantial
returns. The Court held that the plan constituted an investment
contract subject to registration.5 3 In so doing, the Supreme Court
identified three essential elements inherent in every investment
contract: 1) an investment of money, 2) in a common enterprise, 3)
with an expectation of profits to be derived solely from the efforts
of others. 15' Relying on Joiner, the Howey Court further stated
that it was immaterial whether the enterprise was speculative or
nonspeculative and whether there was a sale of property with or
without intrinsic value. 155 These essential elements have been in-
terpreted broadly by courts to effectuate the remedial purpose of
the securities laws.
A. Investment of Money
It is not clear from Joiner and Howey whether the Court's em-
phasis on overtly investment-oriented advertising went to support
courses of dealing which established their character in commerce as 'investment con-
tracts' or as 'any interest or instrument commonly known as a security.'
Id. at 352.
151. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
152. Id. at 295.
153. Id. at 300.
154. Id. at 301.
155. Id. So stating, the Court recognized that a degree of risk is inherent in every invest-
ment purchase, whether speculative (purchased for appreciation potential) or non-specula-
tive (purchased for present value). Thus, any representations or tacit affirmations as to the
current fair market value of an artwork are as critical as representations as to appreciation
potential. Both kinds of purchases may fall within the purview of legislation governing
investments.
The statement that there need be no distinguishing between sales property which pos-
sesses intrinsic value and property which does not is directly applicable to art properties
which, by definition, intend no inherent use or value, with some quasi-functional pieces per-
haps so far excepted. See DUFFY, supra note 6, at 2.
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the satisfaction of the element of monetary investment or of the
element of profit expectation from promoter efforts. ' The Su-
preme Court's reasoning in United Housing Foundation v. For-
man157 offers assistance in distinguishing the concepts underlying
these two elements. In Forman, tenants of Co-Op City, a federally-
subsidized project in New York, alleged that an increase in rental
charges beyond the charges originally estimated in the offer vio-
lated the antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act. Tenants contended
that the nonprofit development organization had falsely repre-
sented that it would bear any cost increases attributable to factors
such as inflation.' 8 The Supreme Court was asked to decide as a
threshold issue whether tenants by purchasing cooperative shares
had invested money in a security. Stating that the determination
of the investment element should be made in light of the economic
reality and totality of the circumstances surrounding the transac-
tion, the Supreme Court emphasized that an investor is "attracted
solely by the prospects of a return on his investment.' ' 159 An inves-
tor must be contrasted to the purchaser who is motivated merely
by a desire to use or consume the item purchased.' 60 The Court
was convinced that the tenants intended to use the dwellings
themselves rather than to exploit them as income-producing prop-
erty.'8 ' Moreover, the offer had not sought to attract investors by
the prospect of profits resulting from the efforts of others, but, on
the contrary had repeatedly emphasized the nonprofit nature of
the endeavor.' 62
156. Investment-oriented advertising may color analysis of all three factors. See, e.g.,
Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Briagadoon Scotch Distributors, Ltd., 388 F. Supp. 1288
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
157. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
158. Id. at 844 and 844 n.8.
159. Id. at 852. The SEC filed an amicus curiae brief urging the Court to hold that
federal securities laws were applicable to the transaction. The Court refused to do so be-
cause it believed that housing cost savings and tax advantages did not satisfy the require-
ment of a showing that an investor have an expectation of "profits." Id. at 858 n.25. Justice
Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas and White, dissented, arguing that common sense and
rudimentary economics did not permit the artifical distinction to be drawn between the
benefits of money saved and money earned. Id. at 863 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 852-53.
161. Id. at 854.
162. Id. Decisions holding that the mere payment of a fee for counselling services does
not constitute an investment contract comport with this test since in those decisions the
item (services) was purchased for consumption. See, e.g., Securities & Exchange Comm'n v.
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Whether an art purchaser is buying for investment or for use
and consumption is difficult to determine because some element of
personal appeal ordinarily accompanies the decision to purchase.
However, in instances in which the art purchaser is uncertain
about a piece judged from its aesthetic merit alone, often the belief
that the piece represents a viable investment property will induce
a purchase. The ultimate inquiry should settle on whether the pur-
chaser seeks any measure of economic advantage in making the
purchase.16 Evidence of a response to an offer framed in invest-
ment terms will reinforce any indication that the purchaser in-
tended to purchase for investment purposes. 1 4
In Glen Arden Commodities, Inc. v. Constantino,'6" defendants
offered for resale Scotch whiskey warehouse receipts at a fixed
price per gallon. Potential customers were solicited through mass
merchandising techniques such as newspaper advertisements and
the indiscriminate use of mailing lists. 66 Prospective purchasers
were promised that the whiskey purchased and remarketed would
double in value in four years and even more rapidly thereafter.
The promise was a blatant misrepresentation since recent surplus
Energy Group of America, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 1234 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Sullivan v. Chase Inv.
Servs., 434 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1977), holding that the offer of investment counselling
services might require registration, however, or give rise to an action under § 206 of the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976).
163. Evidence of consideration given to the current holding period necessary for capital
gains treatment under I.R.C. § 1221 (1978), such as an opinion of counsel that the work was
a capital asset, or similar evidence, would probably be persuasive of an intent to resell. See,
e.g., Art Appraisers of America, [1976] FED. SEC. L. REP. 80,796. See also Loss, supra note
100, at 353.
164. The Ninth Circuit has developed the "risk capital test" to determine whether the
purchase was intended as an investment. Under this test there must be a commitment of
assets with risk of financial loss in order to find an investment. See, e.g., Hector v. Wiens,
533 F.2d 429, 432 (9th Cir. 1976). In that case, it was enough that plaintiff was liable on a
bank promissory note, having borrowed to participate in the offer, for the court to find an
investment of money. See also Cordas v. Specialty Restaurants, 470 F. Supp. 780, 784 (D.
Ore. 1979). Other circuits have readily found an investment of money where the purchaser
has been induced by investment-oriented advertising to incur detriment for an anticipated
gain. Credence is readily granted to the purchaser who reasonably approached the offer as
an investment opportunity. See, e.g., Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Brigadoon Scotch
Distributors, Ltd., 388 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (coins purchased for later resale);
Glen-Arden Commodities, Inc. v. Constantino, 493 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1974) (whiskey ware-
house receipts for resale).
165. 493 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1974).
166. Id. at 1031.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. IX
production had severely depressed prices. ' Purchasers were as-
sured that defendants would assist in remarketing the Scotch or
buy it back themselves. 68 The SEC asserted that the public offer-
ing was a security as defined by section 2 of the 1933 Act and ob-
tained an injunction from the district court. On appeal, defendants
argued that the receipts were mere commodities and petitioned for
mandamus. 69
The Second Circuit upheld the district court decision, stating:
[T]here can be no question but that here the appellants were selling in-
vestment contracts. [They] guaranteed services, they promised results. The
economic inducements were in the nature of inducements to invest .... It
ill behooves [them], after enticing their customers with fancy brochures
touting their investment plan, now to claim there was no investment plan
but the mere sale of an unadorned commodity."'0
The Second Circuit emphasized the repurchase policy as a critical
aspect under the terms of the investment offer. The court noted
that the promised marketing assistance and repurchase, "especially
in light of the absence of a market for small quantities of Scotch,
[was] another distinguishing feature from the commodity analogy,
one crucial to the customer's hope of liquidating his invest-
ment."''
The investment cast of the gallery offer advertised as the "guar-
anteed investment collection" is self-evident. Glen-Arden makes
clear that a repurchase policy will strongly reinforce the presump-
tion of an investment offer created by advertising content.7 2 The
167. Id. at 1032. Moreover, Glen-Arden's price to its customers exceeded wholesale
prices and was considerably in excess of prices charged by other brokers.
168. Id. at 1035.
169. Id. at 1029.
170. Id. at 1034-35 (emphasis added).
171. Id. at 1035. The court stated in a footnote that "[ihe Scotch whiskey investment
game itself is not unknown to the SEC, and courts have uniformly found investment con-
tracts there involved ... ." Id. at 1035 n.7. In fact,,in Securities Act Release No. 5018,
dated November 4, 1969, the SEC issued a warning statement to sellers and distributors of
whiskey that the offer of warehouse receipts constituted the offer of securities requiring
compliance with the registration and antifraud provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. In such
instances, the investor never takes possession of the chattel, but the absence of possession is
not crucial. See note 195 infra and accompanying text.
172. The repurchase policy featured by this form of gallery offer enhances the invest-
ment nature of the offer. Moreover, the investor's reliance on the gallery for a guaranteed
resale is significant to a finding of promoter efforts to maximize profits. See notes 212-23
infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the SEC position on repurchase features.
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distributor of original prints solicits members17 8 by offering proper-
ties explicitly stated to be "investment quality" art.174 In light of
the Supreme Court decisions in Joiner, Howey and Forman, the
economic benefit held out to the volume discount purchaser should
also be recognized as an offer to invest.1 75
B. Common Enterprise
A common enterprise has been defined as "one in which the for-
tunes of the investor are interwoven with and dependent upon the
efforts and success of those seeking the investment or of third par-
ties. 1 76 The necessary commonality in Glen-Arden was found in
the investors' shared reliance upon the representations and ser-
vices of the whiskey promoters.1 77 The element was satisfied de-
spite the fact that any profits were to be realized from independent
173. For a decision holding that the offer of membership in an investment club consti-
tutes the offer of a security, see Matter of Don A. Long, [19801 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1
82,624. See also 87 A.L.R. 2d 1140.
174. The print group also offers investment counsel to its membership. This feature
could trigger the provisions of federal and state investment adviser regulations, although
payment for advisory services alone would not constitute a security. See note 40 supra and
accompanying text.
175. Besides its express rejection of each of the forms of profit found by the Court of
Appeals ... the Court must surprise knowledgeable economists with its proposition
...that profits cannot assume forms other than appreciation of capital or participa-
tion in earnings. All of the varieties of profit involved here accrue to the resident
stockholders in the form of money saved rather than money earned. Not only would
simple common sense teach that the two are the same, but a more sophisticated eco-
nomic analysis also compels the conclusion that in a practical world there is no differ-
ence between the two forms of income. The investor finds no reason to distinguish,
for example, between tax savings and after-tax income. Under a statute having as one
of its 'central purposes' . . . 'to protect investors,' [citations omitted], it is obvious
that the Court errs in distinguishing among types of economic inducements which
have no bearing on the motives of investors. Construction of the statute in terms of
economic reality is more faithful to its 'central purpose'. . . 'to protect investors.'
United Hous. Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 863-64 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (footnotes and citation omitted) (emphasis added).
176. Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Glen W. Turner Enterprises, 474 F.2d 476, 482
n.7 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973). The Supreme Court in Joiner provided a
colorful description of the common enterprise element, stating that the promoter's under-
taking was the "thread on which everybody's beads were strung." 320 U.S. at 348. The
Court also found that the sale of specific land parcels constituted an investment contract
even though the definition in § 2(1) of the 1933 Act includes only fractional undivided inter-
ests. Id. at 352.
177. 493 F.2d at 1034-35.
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resale of the whiskey rather than from apportioned distribution. 176
In Securities & Exchange Commission v. Brigadoon Scotch Dis-
tributors, Ltd.,17 9 the court cautioned that "'the common enter-
prise' [element was not] necessarily the equivalent of the purchase
of a share in a common fund."180 The requisite commonality was
established when "the fortunes of all investors are inextricably tied
to the efficacy of [the promoter's efforts]." '181 An apportioned dis-
tribution of profits is not indispensable to the investment contract
and need no longer be shown."' The inquiry as to common enter-
prise has merged into an evaluation of promoter control which is
often represented by the expert selection or sale of the investment
property. A common enterprise is present when otherwise dispa-
rate investors are joined in purpose by the receipt of similar bene-
fits and a shared reliance on promoter expertise to realize indepen-
dent returns."'
There are several instances of transactions in art in which the
art expert undertakes responsibilities as the "thread on which eve-
rybody's beads are strung.""" For example, an exclusive dealer ex-
erts singular control over the market for his artist's works, and
purchasers of such works rely on the dealer's vigorous continued
promotion of the artist. The dealer who retains on consignment a
work just sold to an investor assumes full responsibility for its
profitable remarketing. The special relationship which permits the
volume discount dealer to market prints at essentially wholesale
prices is conceptually indistinguishable from the manner of distri-
178. The suggestion from Glen-Arden that a common enterprise was created with each
investor relying independently on the promoter recalls the "rimless wheel" constellation
familiar to § 1 Sherman Act litigation.
179. 388 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
180. Id. at 1291.
181. Id. (quoting Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d
473, 479 (5th Cir. 1974)).
182. The apportioned distribution of profits may, of course, still be present in an appro-
priate case. In Turner, the district court found that the investment plan fell into all three
categories enumerated in the § 2(1) definition, namely, an "investment contract," a "certifi-
cate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement," and any "instrument com-
monly known as a security." 474 F.2d at 480.
183. See Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473
(5th Cir. 1974), holding that the crucial inquiry was whether there was a uniformity of im-
pact on investors of the promoter's efforts, and that separate investor returns were no bar to
a finding of a common enterprise.
184. Securities & Exchknge Comm'n v. Joiner, 320 U.S. 344, 348 (1943).
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bution in Glen-Arden. In both instances the buyer purchases not
for personal use and consumption but for profitable resale or other
economic advantage. Under a membership purchase plan, indepen-
dent investors are clearly identifiable as a group receiving similar
benefits from and commonly relying upon a promoter to realize a
profitable return. 88
C. Promoter Efforts
In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Glen Turner Enter-
prises, 86 the Ninth Circuit modified the third Howey factor to re-
quire that profits be expected not solely but only primarily from
the efforts of the promoters or third persons.18 7 The promoters in
Turner marketed self-improvement courses through purchaser
recruiting efforts. 88 The Ninth Circuit, noting the dubious value of
the courses and the likelihood of market saturation, identified the
promoters' commodity as shares in the proceeds of the selling ef-
forts of the promoter, and thus, as an investment contract. 189 The
Turner Court was not deterred by the investor's own exertion to
cultivate new investors. The Ninth Circuit pointed to the remedial
nature of securities law and declared the new test to be "whether
the efforts made by those other than the investor were the undeni-
ably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts which af-
fect the failure or success of the enterprise.' ' 90
185. An Oregon court has addressed the common enterprise element, stating "In this
circuit it is not required that there be a pooling of funds of all investors in order to satisfy
the common enterprise requirement [citation omitted]. The commonality required is that
between the investor and the promoter." Cordas v. Specialty Restaurants, Inc. 470 F. Supp.
780, 784 (D. Ore. 1979). See also Brodt v. Bache & Co., Inc., 595 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1978);
Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1976).
186. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
187. Id. at 482.
188. The purchaser was instructed in hard-sell techniques and then rewarded with a
sizeable commission for each lead he produced. Expansion of the organization by this re-
cruitment methodology was to result in further profits to the investor in the form of share-
holdings. This form of investment scheme, termed "pyramiding" has been outlawed. See
Securities Act Release No. 5211 of Nov. 30, 1971.
189. 474 F.2d at 476, 478, 482. "The purchaser is sold the idea that he will get a fixed
part of the proceeds of the sales. In essence, to get that share, he invests three things: his
money, his efforts to find prospects and bring them to the meetings, and whatever it costs
him to create an illusion of his own affluence." Id. at 482.
190. Id. "[The selling efforts of the promoter] are the sine qua non of the scheme; those
efforts are what keeps it going; those efforts are what produces the money which is to make
him rich. In essence, it is the right to share in the proceeds of those efforts that he buys."
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Several decisions since Turner have recognized that the pro-
moter need not apply "managerial" efforts. Frequently it is the
promoter's market expertise which constitutes the efforts upon
which the investor relies. In Glen-Arden,191 the investor was de-
pendent upon the promoters to utilize their expertise in selecting
the type and quality of Scotch whiskey and casks to be purchased
for resale by the investors in an enterprise virtually guaranteed to
"double their money" in four years. Emphasizing the investor's re-
liance on the promoter's expertise, the Second Circuit stated,
"[tihere have been many other schemes. . . where the public was
led into buying what purported to be tangible items when in fact
what was being sold was an investment entrusting the promoters
with both the work and the expertise to make the tangible invest-
ment pay off." 1" It was clear that the investors in Glen-Arden
would not have entered the market but for their explicit reliance
on the promoter's promise of expert assistance in selecting and
marketing the investment property.198
In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Brigadoon Scotch
Distributors, Ltd., e" promoters expertly compiled and sold rare
Id. The case has been widely approved, Annot., 54 A.L.R.3d. 217, 239-41 (1973). The outer
limit of the test may have been reached in Coffin v. Tricoli, 470 F. Supp. 7 (E.D. Va. 1977),
rev'd. sub. nom. Coffin v. Polishing Machines, Inc. 596 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 868 (1979), wherein a 50% purchaser was found to have "bought himself a job with the
company." Id. at 11. The court stated "[a]n investor who also becomes a part of manage-
ment should not be able to claim the protection of the Act merely because others in the
common enterprise exert essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of
the enterprise." Id. For a New York decision following Turner, see Securities & Exchange
Comm'n v. Galaxy Foods, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 559 (2d
Cir. 1977).
191. 493 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1974).
192. Id. at 1035 (emphasis in original). See also Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Paro,
468 F. Supp. 635 (N.D.N.Y. 1979). Defendant in that case solicited investors for its "co-op
advertising" publication. The investor was "assigned" a product, with the promoter han-
dling all elements of publication and processing of orders for the unfamiliar product. The
investor was assured a small fortune for trusting to the promoter's "brilliant advertising
skills" the development of a market for the product. The investor never saw any part of the
operation save his proportionate share of the proceeds. Id. at 639-41.
193. 493 F.2d at 1032. Later, citing Forman, the court stated, "[i]n light of the economic
reality and the totality of circumstances surrounding the sales here, the customers were
making an investment, which in view of the appellant's commitments and representations
constituted an 'investment contract' within the meaning of § 2(1) of the Securities Act." Id.
at 1034.
194. 388 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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coin portfolios. While the investors in Glen Arden were enticed by
promises of discount prices and consequent resale profits, Bri-
gadoon marketed its coin collections expressly with a view to ap-
preciation value.'as The court focused on the promoters' offer of
purported expertise to the investor by pointing out that Brigadoon
advertised to a general readership rather than in collectors' trade
publications. a'9 Specifically addressing itself to the Howey "ef-
forts" element, the court stated that "[tihe representations made
in the advertisement pamphlet present a package of expert skills
deliverable to any FCR customer and offered to maximize the capi-
tal of FCR investors."'9 The promoters' application of selective
expertise went into the investment package as "the most crucial
factor in determining how much profit an investor in coins would
make." 198 It was clear that the investors relied on the promoters'
representations of appreciation potential and that each coin's pre-
sent value was a direct correlative of that potential.' ss
In Matter of Gardner v. Lefkowitz,200 petitioner contested the
application of New York's Martin Act 20' to its offer for sale to the
public of diamonds, arguing that the sale was no more than a sim-
ple exchange of personalty for a purchase price. It urged that the
basic nature of the transaction was not altered by the fact that a
195. The Second Circuit declined to distinguish these decisions on the fact alone that
Brigadoon investors acquired custody of their coins, holding that "possession per se [did not
reconvert] an investment contract to the sale of a commodity." Id. at 1293.
196. Id. at 1291.
197. Id. at 1292.
198. Id. at 1292-93.
199. The Second Circuit stated that, "[clomparisons of gains in the stock market with
returns from coins, analysis of coin appreciation and similar investment information [ran] in
a constant and main stream throughout FCR's sales pitch." Id. at 1291. Thus, the original
language from Howey requiring an expectation of "profits" is broad enough to include
earned or distributed profits and appreciation gains, that is, capital gains on resales or tax
deductions on donations. See also Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc., [1980] FED. Sac. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 97,600. "That the plaintiffs did not expect to realize any tangible gain until
they sold their property does not preclude investment intent." Id. 1 98,179.
200. 97 Misc. 2d 806, 412 N.Y.S.2d 740 (Sup. Ct., 1978)
201. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352 (McKinney 1968). The immediate threat to Gardner
posed by an adverse decision was an investigation into its business operations by the state
attorney general. In this regard the court stated that "one of the reasons for [the investiga-
tion] is to adequately develop a factual basis for a determination by the Attorney General as
to whether or not the object being investigated comes within the scope of his authority
under the Martin Act." 97 Misc. 2d at 812, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
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diamond may often have value as an investment.0 2
After analyzing petitioner's sales methods,203 and noting the
overt investment orientation of petitioner's advertising, the Gard-
ner court concluded that the diamonds were meant as investment
purchases. They were described to the public as an investment and
that was the thrust of the purchase. 04 Pointing to the significance
granted by Joiner and Howey to the promoter's manner of presen-
tation, the Gardner court held petitioner to its own advertising
representations, and ruled that "petitioners [had been] emphati-
cally entrusted with the. work and [diamond] expertise of produc-
ing a payoff."20 5
A promoter offering an investment-type property with some pro-
vision made for maximizing the investor's capital will be deemed to
be offering a security.20 6 A promoter maximizes profits through the
offer of expert advice or the selection of the investment property
preceding the sale.0 7 Unfortunately, the public policy statements
202. Id. at 812, 412 N.Y.S.2d .at 746. The purchaser was permitted to return any item
within five days of delivery. Id. at 807, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 742. As a further distinction, peti-
tioner argued that no instrument had been delivered to the purchaser, only the sales item
itself. Id. at 812, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 745. The absence of an instrument is irrelevant.
203. Petitioner employed both commercial advertisements and random telephone can-
vasses followed up by dissemination of a descriptive brochure. Id. at 814, 412 N.Y.S.2d at
746-47.
204. Id. at 813, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 746.
205. Id. at 815, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 747.
206. A frequent claim is made that because diamonds, art and other properties bought
outright are traded on a fluctuating market, there can be no satisfaction of the third Howey
element. See, e.g., Art Appraisers of America, supra note 43, 87,081. The Turner court
cautioned that "the word 'solely' should not be read as a strict or literal limitation on the
definition of an investment contract, but rather must be construed realistically, so as to
include within the definition those schemes which involve in substance, if not form, securi-
ties." 474 F.2d at 482. Inherent in the analysis is the self-evident understanding that market
fluctuations are seldom within the control of anyone. The argument that returns are the
product of sheer chance fails completely with the introduction of an exclusive dealer or
distributor whose very attraction to clients lies in his enhanced influence on the market. See
note 18 supra.
207. In Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Energy Group of America, Inc., 459 F. Supp.
1234 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), the decisions just discussed were categorized
either as cases where investors contributed capital to an enterprise expecting a partic-
ipation in earnings resulting from the use of their funds, or as cases where tangible or
intangible property was purchased by the investor in the expectation that it would
appreciate in value, either because of the promoter's expertise in selecting the prop-
erty or because of the promoter's managerial or entrepreneurial efforts subsequent to
the purchase of the property.
Id. at 1241.
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issued by the SEC do not yet reflect the importance of presale
maximization efforts.
VI. Current SEC Position
A review of recent "no action" letter requests " isolates three
"swing factors" which are afforded considerable weight by the SEC
when testing for the presence of an investment contract which
would be subject to section five registration.20 9 These factors are: 1)
resale services or marketing assistance; 2) installment sales; and 3)
repurchase features.2 10 Any one or a combination of these factors
will likely be present in a typical art transaction.
A. Resale Services
In Glen Arden, the Second Circuit noted that the requisite pro-
moter efforts were satisfied by the offer to assist investors in
remarketing their whiskey. For that purpose investors were pro-
vided with a list of potential buyers.2  It is the position of the
SEC that assistance may be indirectly provided.
Recently, Photographic Artists, Ltd. ("PAL"), requested a no ac-
tion letter from the SEC regarding PAL's proposed sale of original
photographic transparencies to individual purchasers.' PAL of-
fered investors a standard form agreement which provided for the
production and marketing of the transparencies as prints by an un-
affiliated company.' The SEC expressed the view that this sales
208. See note 107 supra.
209. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976). See notes 101-10 supra and accompanying text.
210. See Boston Advisory Group, SEC Staff Reply Letter of Dec. 5, 1976. Although al-
ready registered as investment advisers, the Boston Advisory Group was cautioned that its
proposed diamond offering might also require registration as a broker.
211. See also [19761 FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 87,079; Art Appraisers of America, Ltd.,
SEC Staff Reply Letter of Sept. 3, 1976 (available October 4, 1976). Art Appraisers provided
its purchasers with a list of charitable organizations willing to accept donations of the prints
sold in volume discount. Inasmuch as this service assists purchasers in liquidating their in-
vestments, it is indistinguishable from the promoter assistance in Glen-Arden. The SEC
stated to Art Appraisers that it would not recommend enforcement action, apparently be-
cause most purchasers were motivated by anticipated tax benefits, although others intended
resale. The economic advantage held out to the volume discount purchaser, even in the form
of a tax write-off, could be better viewed as constituting an investment of money. See note
168 supra. Moreover, it is clear that purchasers did not buy the print packages for use or
consumption. See United Hous. Foundation v. Forman, 421 U.S. 873 (1975).
212. See Photographic Artists Ltd., SEC Staff Reply Letter of Oct. 6, 1977 (available
Nov. 7, 1977), [1977-1978] FED. Szc. L. REP. (CCH) 81,389.
213. This unaffiliated company was also to handle the advertisement for the prints.
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method might involve the offering of a registrable security and
stressed the pre-negotiated production and marketing agreement
offered by PAL.214
The offer by Metropolitan Graphic Art Distributors, Inc.
("MGA"), provides an example of resale services which may ac-
company the distribution of original prints.15 MGA acquired en-
tire editions of each work directly from the artist and thus acted as
exclusive distributor for each work. It proposed to make daily
value quotations available to the purchasers and to otherwise assist
them in finding a market for the prints.2 s Responding to the no
action letter request, the SEC cautioned that the offer probably
constituted the offer of a security subject to registration. In so con-
cluding, the SEC emphasized the provision by MGA of resale ser-
vices and its publication of daily value quotations.
B. Installment Sales
Frequently the method by which payment is made for art
properties will create a relation between the parties which contin-
ues beyond the date of purchase. The use of installment payment
plans by many galleries and the similarity of such plans in some
cases to margin accounts has been pointed out.2 1 7 The likelihood
that an installment payment plan will be offered is naturally great-
est when the investment property purchased is an expensive piece
of art.
The SEC refused a no action letter request relating to the sale of
lithographic plates by Creative Art Industries.218 The offer pro-
posed to furnish each purchaser with quotations from four distrib-
utors capable of reproducing and marketing the reproductions na-
tionally. In addition to these resale services, the sales plan
214. The SEC stated further that the offering was not eligible for exemption under Rule
146 and found an integration. See notes 111-14 supra (discussing exemption and the factors
examined in testing for integration).
215. See Metropolitan Graphic Art Distributors, Inc., SEC Staff Reply Letter of May 31,
1977, (available Aug. 15, 1977). After an unfavorable reply, Metropolitan attempted to
restructure its offer to comport with the features of the offer by Art Appraisers of America.
See other letters of May 12, 1977, June 15, 1977, June 30, 1977 and Aug. 15, 1977.
216. MGA also offered a repurchase policy, discussed at notes 223-24 infra and accom-
panying text.
217. See notes 17-18 supra and accompanying text.




provided for payment in part from a percentage of the purchaser's
gross sales of reproductions from the plate over a nine-year
period.2 19
C. The Repurchase Feature
The Heritage Bookshop requested a no action letter from the
SEC concerning a proposal to offer a "Rare Book Investment Port-
folio" by membership subscription.2 0 The offer featured a repur-
chase option periodically exercisable by the purchaser at fixed in-
creasing rates of return .2 2  Alternatively, the purchaser could
consign books back to the seller for resale. 2 ' The SEC expressed
the view that the offer constituted an investment contract subject
to section five registration. In so doing, the SEC emphasized the
guaranty arrangements featured by the offer.
The no action letter request from MGA also included a simple
offer to repurchase any print at the prevailing market rates indi-
cated by its daily value quotations. The terms of such an offer,
while not guarantying any profit, nevertheless assure the purchaser
of a resale at any time.22 The SEC rejected the request, stating
that the presence of the repurchase feature presented a serious
question of vulnerability to section five registration."4
219. Payment to the print distributor by this method may provide incentive to the pur-
chaser to market its reproductions, while creating the inextricable tie to the promoter de-
scribed in Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d at 479.
220. See Heritage Bookshop, SEC Staff Reply Letter of Mar. 13, 1979. This offer by
membership subscription is similar to that made by the print distributor discussed at notes
35-42 supra. For a decision holding that the offer of membership in an investment club
constituted the offer of a security, see Matter of Don A. Long, [1980] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) I S82,624.
221. See notes 27-34 supra and accompanying text.
222. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
223. The SEC has rejected the argument that a 10% guaranteed profit is "too low to
induce a person to buy." See Longines Symphonette Society, SEC Staff Reply Letter of
Nov. 10, 1972, (available Dec. 11, 1972), [1972-1973] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,151. See
also Department of Commerce v. DeBeers Diamond Inv., Ltd., 89 Mich. App. 406, 280
N.W.2d 547 (Ct. App. 1979), for a decision holding that the offer to buy back any diamond
purchased at the current prevailing market price was insufficient to constitute a security.
The merchants in DeBeers warranted that the offering cost to investors would be at least
75% below fair market value. However, investors discovered when they sought to exercise
the repurchase option that the promoters were unwilling to pay the prevailing market price,
offering to buy back only at their own current discount rate.
224. It is conceivable that a seller's offer to refund the buyer's purchase price could con-
stitute a repurchase policy if the option is kept open for a considerable length of time.
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VII. Conclusion
The reach of the securities law has consistently widened through
the implementation by the SEC and the courts of its broad policy
of investor protection whenever appropriate. Courts have followed
the Supreme Court's reasoning in Joiner and Howey that the na-
ture of the investment property is irrelevant if the substance of an
investment contract is present. The attitude, frequently unarticu-
lated but persistent, that art works are exchanged in a rarefied
context of reverential appreciation for their intrinsic aesthetic
merit may perpetuate reluctance to regulate the art market. Yet,
art is an investment property which is traded by businessmen in a
brisk and economically broad-based market. Recognition that the
substance of an art transaction constitutes an investment contract
or other form of security should trigger familiar investor
protections.
Significant investor reliance is placed on the art merchant to
maximize profits through his expert selection, compilation, recom-
mendations or representations preceding or attending the art
purchase. Such reliance is reinforced by the offer of services subse-
quent to sale such as a repurchase policy, installment plan or mar-
keting assistance. The assertion that profits on a fluctuating art
market are the uncontrollable product of chance and thus not the
province of the art merchant is without merit. In those instances in
which the dealer-client relationship threatens confusion resembling
that between broker-dealers and their customers, a similar bar
against overreaching and liability for unwarranted recommenda-
tions should be imposed. Art advisers or others who provide invest-
ment counsel should be subjected to applicable state or federal in-
vestment adviser regulations.
Any burden imposed on the art community by the registration
and antifraud strictures of federal and state securities law is out-
weighed by the benefit to the public of the preventive and reme-
dial protections afforded by their application.2 2 5 In appropriate in-
225. The filing procedures under the Martin Act relevant to dealers and advisors active
within New York State could be simply complied with and would help ensure that such
persons are qualified and reputable. The broad discretion accorded the attorney general
under the Martin Act to investigate unfair trade practices and to ascertain during the pro-
cess whether a security is present facilitates local elimination of impediments to the art
market in New York.
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stances, federal and state antifraud provisions will improve the
opportunity for effective investor redress now severely hampered
by the prevailing doctrine of caveat emptor and the high thresh-
olds required to establish proof of common law fraud. Registration
provides useful investment information, With care taken to exempt
only those offers to persons able to fend for themselves.
Effective self-regulatory measures similar in impact to those fol-
lowed in the securities market might be implemented by the art
dealing community. 2 6 A central governing association with strict
certification or membership criteria and sanctioning power could
do much to increase public confidence. Recourse before an expert
arbitration panel with members rule-bound to arbitrate customer
disputes would enhance market relations and reduce costly
litigation.
Maureen Holm
226. The harsher alternative, of course, would be state licensing or certification of art
merchants.
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